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Notes
ADmisSION TO PRAcncE LAw: Civil Rights Arrests and Numerous Fist Fights
Do Not Evidence the Type of Character Deficiency Which Excludes an
Applicant From Admission to the Bar-Hallinan v. Committee of Bar
Examiners (Cal. 1966).
Good moral character is a universally required professional qualification
for an attorney.' There is however no agreement concerning what constitutes
sufficient good moral character: 2 "Some there are who seem to think that [an
attorney] should adhere to the standard prescribed for Caesar's wife. Others
come close to insisting that the lawyer, as well as the Boy Scout, should be
clean, reverent and brave." 3 In Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners,4 the
California Supreme Court found that an applicant for admission to the California
bar possessed sufficient good moral character despite a number of arrests for
acts of civil disobedience in civil rights demonstrations and a history of "alleged
habitual and continuing resort to fisticuffs to settle personal differences." 5 This
Note examines the Hallinan decision and the use of good moral character as a
standard in determining fitness to practice law.
The United States Supreme Court has observed that definitions of good moral
character necessarily vary with "the attitudes, experiences, and prejudices of
the definer." 6 The content of good moral character is seldom defined directly,
instead it is usually defined in terms of its converse-moral turpitude.7 Moral
1 See, e.g., Starrs, Considerations on Determination of Good Moral Character, 18 U. Dfr.
LJ. 295 (1955). This Note will not distinguish between admission and disciplinary proceed-
ings. In the past it was fashionable to say that higher substantive and procedural standards
must be met to disbar an attorney on the theory that an attorney had a vested property
right in maintaining his established practice whereas an applicant for admission was merely
seeking a privilege. See, e.g., Note, 65 YALE L.J. 873 (1956). However, this distinction has
been discredited, Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 239 n.5 (1957), and was
specifically disapproved by Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 65 A.C. 485, 490 n.3,
421 P.2d 76, 80-81 n.3, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228, 232-33 n.3 (1966), where the -California supreme
court concluded that the test for admission and discipline is the same. Id. at 491, 421 P.2d
at 81, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 233. The distinction which still generally remains between the two is
that for admission the burden is upon the applicant to prove that he is morally fit, whereas
for disbarment it is upon the bar to prove that an attorney is morally unfit. E.g., id. at 490,
421 P.2d at 80, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 232.
2See text accompanying notes 15 and 16 infra.
a V. COuxTRYzuN & T. Fnrm-r, TaE LAwrER nz MODERN SocITy 803 (1966).
-169 A.C. 485, 421 P.2d 76, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1966).
G Id. at 493, 421 P.2d at 82, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
6 Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 263 (1957).
7 See, e.g., id.; In re Rothrock, 16 Cal. 2d 449, 106 P.2d 907 (1940) ; Baker v. Miller, 236
Ind. 20, 138 N.E.2d 145 (1956); CAr,. Bus. & PRor. CODE §§ 6101, 6106 (West 1954); WEST
VA. Con ch. 30, art. 2, § 6 (1966). See also Comment, Moral Turpitude as the Criterion of
Offenses that Justify Disbarment, 24 CAUiF. L. REv. 9 (1935). The United States Supreme
Court also appears to treat moral turpitude as the relevant criterion under the due process
and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment in reviewing refusal of admission
to the bar. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 263 (1957); Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 242 (1957).
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turpitude, in turn, has been broadly defined as conduct which is "contrary to
justice, honesty, and good morals,"8 and acts of "baseness, vileness or depravity
in the duties which one person owes to another or to society in general."
Predictably, the inherent ambiguity in any definition of good moral character
or moral turpitude makes it difficult to apply such concepts as standards in
judging professional fitness.10
The cases express two views regarding the extent of the good moral charac-
ter requirement. One view sees it as the totality of an individual's conduct
measured by prevailing community standards and contains all the inherently
subjective and pervasive implications of morality, respectability and good
citizenship.'" The other, and the minority view, adopts a functional approach
and inquires into a person's character only to the extent that it relates to the
proper performance of an attorney's work.' 2
The divergence between the two views was evidenced in an early United
States Supreme Court case, Ex parte Wall, which involved an attorney who
allegedly participated in a lynching.' 4 The majority, affirming disbarment,
quoted Lord Mansfield: "[T/he question is ... whether, after the conduct of
this man, it is proper that he should continue a member of a profession which
should stand free from all suspicion."' 5 Justice Field dissented forcefully: "It
is not for every moral offense which may leave a stain upon the character that
courts can summon an attorney to account. Many persons, eminent at the bar,
... have been frequenters at the gaming-table,. . . dissolute in their habits, [or]
... engaged in broils and quarrels disturbing the public peace; but . . . it is
only for that moral delinquency which consists in a want of integrity and
trustworthiness, and renders him an unsafe person to manage the legal business
of others, that the courts can interfere and summon him before them."'"
According to accepted doctrine, good moral character in an attorney is
8 E.g., Noland v. State Bar, 63 Cal. 2d 298, 302, 405 P.2d 129, 131, 46 Cal. Rptr. 305,
307 (1965). But cf. In re Morris, 74 N.M. 679, 397 P.2d 475 (1964).
9 Committee on Legal Ethics v. Scherr, 149 W. Va. 721, 726, 143 S.E.2d 141, 145 (1965).
10 Bar examiners are not always willing to acknowledge such difficulties. The chairman
of one admissions committee, after stating that "decisions cannot be made without guiding
principles any more than business can be transacted without money," Starrs, Considerations
on Determination of Good Moral Character, 18 U. D-r. LJ. 295, 305 (1955), then concluded
that "the general principles of what has come to be known as Judaeo-Christian morality,
which embodies the natural law as recognized by all men, must be the general principles by
which an applicant must live if he is to be considered of good moral character," Id. at 305-06.
To the criticism that this is perhaps vague when applied as a standard in determining ad-
mission to a profession, he answered that "this is not a foggy notion .... We understand
more than we can express." Id. at 306.
1 See, e.g., Grievance Comm. v. Broder, 112 Conn. 269, 152 A. 292 (1930). See also
note 10 supra; text accompanying note 91 infra.
12 See text accompanying note 16 infra.
18 107 U.S. 265 (1882).
14 There was some dispute concerning the attorney's participation in the lynch mob.
It is possible that he was merely a spectator. See id. at 266-70; id. at 292-9% (dissenting
opinion). The attorney was never disbarred in the state courts and it is reported that he
"lived to become a state court judge, apparently well thought of." Starrs, supra note 10, at
297-98 n.g.
15 107 U.S. at 273
16 id. at 306-07.
[ Vol. 55: 899
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required to protect the public.1- However, because there is perhaps no clear
view of what is required to protect the public adequately,"' preserving the
prestige and dignity of the legal profession has often become an additional
interest to be protected.19
Under both the functional and community-standards approaches, conduct
which has brought an individual's character into question can be divided into
two categories. The first category consists of conduct which involves a person's
honesty and candor-his trustworthiness. Lack of such trustworthiness is suffi-
cient under both approaches to prohibit a person from practicing law.20 The
second category consists of conduct which presents issues of moral and social
acceptability in general and which may or may not involve a person's trust-
worthiness. Where trustworthiness is not involved, cases applying the com-
munity-standards approach differ considerably concerning what justifies barring
a person from practicing law.2 ' The functional approach inquires into moral
and social behavior only to the extent that it relates to trustworthiness.
Under either approach, the general view is that it is irrelevant whether
conduct in question on character grounds is also a violation of the law.P2 The
inquiry is solely to determine how the specific conduct reflects on a person's
moral character. Certain offenses, however, are under common law doctrine or
by statute ipso facto grounds for denial of admission and for disbarment on the
ground that such offenses inherently involve moral turpitude.23 Thus, under
the prevalent view conviction of a felony will result in disbarment or denial
17 See, e.g., Zitny v. State Bar, 64 Cal. 2d 787, 790-91 n.1, 415 P.2d 521, 523 n.1, 51
Cal. Rptr. 825, 827 n.1 (1966) ; In re Nesselson, 35 Il1. 2d 454, 220 N.E.2d 409, 412 (1966);
authorities cited note 19 infra. Another purpose sometimes given for requiring good moral
character of an attorney is to preserve the public's confidence in the courts and the judicial
system. However, preserving public confidence in the judicial system is merely one aspect
of protecting the public rather than an independent purpose. The maintenance of an effective
judicial system is for the public's protection, and loss of the public's confidence in the system
would undermine its effectiveness. See text accompanying note 73 infra.
18 Compare "It would indeed be a travesty, if the court were powerless to restrain
rogues from parading as its officers, simply because they were clever enough to divorce their
professional lives from their private lives," In re Fischer, 231 App. Div. 193, 202, 247 N.Y.S.
168, 170 (1930) (attorney suspended because he had a monetary interest in a social club
in which card games for money were played), with justice Field's plea, text accompanying
note 16 supra.
19 See, e.g., In re Rothrock, 16 Cal. 2d 449, 459, 106 P.2d 907, 912 (1940) ; In re Becker,
16 Ill. 2d 488, 496, 158 N.E.2d 753, 757 (1959); In re Serritella, 5 Ili. 2d 392, 398, 125 N.E.2d
531, 534 (1955); In re Rothrock, 406 S.W.2d 840, 841 (Ky. 1966); In re Lynch, 238 S.W.2d
118, 120 (Ky. 1951) ("to uphold the ideals and traditions of an honorable profession").
See also ABA CANONs OF PROFEssIoNAL Ermcs No. 29 and the relevance of public notoriety,
discussed in text accompanying notes 96-98 infra.
20 See authorities cited notes 25-38 infra.
21 See authorities cited notes 39-57 infra.
22 See, e.g., In re Hallinan, 43 Cal. 2d 243, 248, 272 P.2d 768, 771 (1954) ; In re Rothrock,
16 Cal. 2d 449, 106 P.2d 907 (1940) ; Baker v. Miller, 236 Ind. 20, 24-26, 138 N.E.2d 145,
147-48 (1956) ; In re Percy, 36 N.Y. 651 (1867).
23 See In re Rothrock, 16 Cal. 2d 449, 106 P.2d 907 (1940) ; Baker v. Miller, 236 Ind.
20, 24-26, 138 N.E.2d 145, 147-48 (1956); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6101, 6106 (West
1954); WEsr VA. CODE, ch. 30, art. 2, § 6 (1966); Comment, 24 CALiF. L. REv. 9 (1935);
authorities cited note 24 infra.
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of admission; conviction of a misdemeanor, only if moral turpitude was in-
volved in the particular offense.24
In the category involving trustworthiness, it has been held that blackmail,
2
6
bribery,26 assisting to collect ransom, 27 assisting to dispose of stolen goods,28
embezzlement, 29 extortion,80 forgery,' income tax fraud,8 2 larceny,88 misap-
propriation of clients' funds,34 murder,3 5 passing of bad checks,
80 perjury, 37
and a practice of putting slugs in parking meters38 all evidence the type of
character which disqualifies a person from practicing law. In the category in-
volving moral and social acceptability, conduct casting doubt on a person's
fitness to practice law has included sexual misconduct,39 violations of liquor
24 See, e.g., Bartos v. United States Dist. Ct., 19 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1927) ; In re Kirby,
84 F. 606 (D.S.D. 1898) ; In re Clark, 52 Cal. 2d 322, 340 P.2d 613 (1959) ; State v. Bieber,
121 Kan. 536, 247 P. 875 (1926); In re Welansky, 319 Mass. 205; 65 N.E.2d 202 (1946);
In re Devine, 26 App. Div. 211, 272 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1966).
25 People v. Varnum, 28 Colo. 349, 64 P. 202 (1901) ; In re Hart, 131 App. Div. 661,
116 N.Y.S. 193 (1909).
2 6 In re Wilson, 76 Ariz. 49, 258 P.2d 433 (1953) ; Zitny v. State Bar, 64 Cal. 2d 787,
415 P.2d 521, 51 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1966) (charges of soliciting bribes not sustained, attorney
reprimanded on other grounds); In re Wilson, 216 N.E.2d 555 (Ind. 1966); In re Wellcome,
23 Mont. 450, 59 P. 445 (1899) ; Matter of Levy, 260 App. Div. 722, 23 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1940),
aff'd mem., 288 N.Y. 489, 41 N.E.2d 788 (1942) ; In re Boland, 127 App. Div. 746, 111 N.Y.S.
932 (1908) ; In re Simpson, 79 Okla. 305, 192 P. 1097 (1920).
2 7 In re Richards, 333 Mo. 907, 63 S.W.2d 672 (1933).
2 8 People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n Jackson, 322 Ill. 618, 153 N.E. 621 (1926).
2 9 
In re Cruickshank, 47 Cal. App. 496, 190 P. 1038 (1920) ; People ex rel. Colorado Bar
Ass'n v. Bryce, 36 Colo. 125, 84 P. 816 (1906); In re Lynch, 238 S.W.2d 118 (Ky. 1951);
In re Rockmore, 139 App. Div. 71, 123 N.Y.S. 928 (1910).
30 Barton v. State Bar, 2 Cal. 2d 294, 40 P.2d 502 (1935) ; In re Malmin, 364 Ill. 164,
4 N.E.2d 111 (1936).
31 In re Rothrock, 406 S.W.2d 840 (Ky. 1966) ; Nelson v. Commonwealth, 128 Ky. 779,
109 S.W. 337 (1908) ; State v. Stringfellow, 128 La. 463, 54 So. 943 (1911) ; In re Sutton,
50 Mont. 88, 145 P. 6 (1914).
3 2 In re Williams, 221 Minn. 554, 23 N.W.2d 4 (1946).
33 In re Urias, 65 A.C. 261, 418 P.2d 849, 53 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1966); In re Henry, 15
Idaho 755, 99 P. 1054 (1909); In re King, 232 Minn. 327, 45 N.W.2d 562 (1950); In re
Ross, 279 App. Div. 665, 108 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1951); In re Liliopoulos, 175 Wash. 338 27
P.2d 691 (1933). But cf. Ex parte Edmead, 27 F.2d 438, 439 (D. Mass. 1928) (deportation
proceeding of an alien) ("While there is authority that all larceny involves turpitude ...I
am not prepared to agree that a boy who steals an apple from an orchard is guilty of
'inherently base, vile, or depraved conduct.' ") ; In re State Bd. of Bar Examiners, 183 So.
2d 688 (Fla. 1966) (conviction of petty larceny does not bar admission to the bar).
84 Simmons v. State Bar, 65 A.C. 286, 419 P.2d 161, 54 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1966) ; Sturr v.
State Bar, 52 Cal. 2d 125, 338 P.2d 897 (1959).
8 5 In re Johnson, 143 N.W.2d 382 (Minn. 1966); In re Patrick 136 App. Div. 450, 120
N.Y.S. 1006 (1910).
3 In re Blasi, 47 N.J. 447, 221 A.2d 524 (1966) (attorney suspended pending further
action); In re Shapiro, 263 App. Div. 659, 34 N.Y.S.2d 285, (1942); In re Dubinsky, 256
App. Div. 102, 7 N.Y.S.2d 387 (1938).
71In re Ulmer, 208 F. 461 (N.D. Ohio 1913) ; In re O'Keefe, 55 Mont. 200, 175 P. 593
(1918); In re Katzkie, 142 App. Div. 352, 126 N.Y.S. 842 (1911).
3
8 Fellner v. Bar Ass'n, 213 Md. 243, 131 A.2d 729 (1957).
39 Grievance Comm. v. Broder, 112 Conn. 269, 152 A. 292 (1930) (adultery, attorney
disbarred); People ex rel. Black v. Smith, 290 Ill. 241, 124 N.E. 807 (1919) (frequenting a
[Vol. 5: 899
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laws,40 drunkenness,41 assault,42 an intemperate nature and use of abusive
language, 43 gambling,44 income tax evasion,4 5 traffic violations, 46 making anony-
mous "crank" telephone calls,47 participating in a lynching,48 fighting a duel,49
disorderly house insufficient grounds for disbarment); In re Meyerson, 190 Md. 671, 59
A.2d 489 (1948) (helping obtain an abortion, no attorney-client relationship involved,
application for reinstatement of disbarred attorney denied); In re Van Wyck, 207 Minn. 145,
290 NAV. 227 (1940) (indecent assault on boy fifteen, attorney disbarred) ; In re Fleckenstein,
34 N.J. 20, 166 A.2d 753 (1960) (lewdness and carnal indecency, attorney suspended, illness
requiring psychiatric treatment a mitigating circumstance); In re Wesler, 1 N.J. 573, 64
A.2d 880 (1949) (statutory rape, attorney disbarred); In re Gould, 4 App. Div. 2d 174, 164
N.Y.S.2d 48 (1957) (attempt to coerce into prostitution and assault with intent to commit
rape, attorney disbarred); Matter of Okin, 272 App. Div. 607, 73 N.Y.S.2d 861 (1947)
(keeping a disorderly house, attorney disbarred); In re Hicks, 163 Okla. 29, 20 P.2d 896
(1933) (married father of six accused of siring child of a mentally defective woman, attorney
disbarred) ; In re Marsh, 42 Utah 186, 129 P. 411 (1913) (keeping a disorderly house, attorney
disbarred). Disreputable sexual behavior has been reported as the second most frequent
reason for dismissing students from law school. Kempner, Current Practices of Law Schools
with Respect to Character Qualifications of Students, 34 BAR Exammem 106, 109 (1965).
4 0 Violations of liquor prohibition has provoked perhaps the sharpest conflict among
the courts. For example, where a jug containing a small quantity of intoxicants was found
on the back porch of an attorney's home, the attorney was disbarred. State v. Bieber, 121
Kan. 536, 247 P. 875 (1926). On the other hand, it has been held that a three year suspension
was not warranted in the case of an attorney who often offered a glass of beer to his
guests. Bartos v. United States Dist. Ct., 19 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1927). See cases cited in
Comment, Moral Turpitude as the Criterion of Offenses that Justify Disbarment, 24 CAI=.
L. REv. 9, 17 n.34 (1935).
41 In re Urias, 65 A.C. 261, 418 P.2d 849, 53 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1966) (attorney suspended);
Wood v. State ex rel Boykin, 45 Ga. App. 783, 165 S.. 908 (1932) (attorney disbarred);
In re Wells, 293 Ky. 201, 168 SAV.2d 730 (1943) (attorney disbarred); In re Osmond, 174
Okla. 561, 54 P.2d 319 (1935) (attorney disbarred); Aax. STAT. ANN. title 25, ch. 4, §
25-401 (1947); IDAXo CODE title 3, § 3-301(6) (1947).4 2 In re Rothrock, 16 Cal. 2d 449, 106 P.2d 907 (1940) (conviction of assault with a
deadly weapon found under the circumstances not to involve moral turpitude and not
warranting disbarment); accord, State v. Metcalfe, 204 Iowa 123, 214 N.W. 874 (1927).
4 3 Ex parte Keeley, 189 P. 885 (Ore. 1920) (California attorney denied admission to
Oregon bar); But cf. People v. Palmer, 61 111. 255 (1871) (attorney disbarred on other
grounds). See also authorities cited in note 56 infra.
4 4 See In re Fischer, 231 App. Div. 193, 247 N.Y.S. 168 (1930) (attorney suspended
because he had a monetary interest in a social club where card games for money were
played).
45 Since tax evasion includes various kinds of conduct, including mere negligent failure
to file a tax return, some independent showing besides conviction is required to show moral
turpitude. In re Hallinan, 43 Cal. 2d 243 272 P. 678 (1954); Baker v. Miller, 236 Ind. 20,
138 N.2d 145 (1956). Tax evasion should be distinguished from tax fraud. See note 32
supra.
461n re Blasi, 47 N.J. 447, 221 A.2d 524 (1966) (disregarding court complaints for
traffic violations, attorney suspended pending further action). Numerous convictions for
traffic violations have been reported as a reason for denying admission by law schools on
character grounds. Kempner, supra note 39.
47 State ex rel. Bar Ass'n v. Ablah, 348 P.2d 172 (Okla. 1959) (attorney suspended).4 8 EX parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1882) (attorney disbarred from practice in federal
courts, but remained a member of the Flordia bar and later became a state judge, see note
14 supra.)
49 Smith v. Tennessee, 9 Tenn. 228 (1828) (attorney disbarred).
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"bugging" a governor's nansion,50 conviction of "wire-tapping,"5 1 conviction
of a federal airplane "bomb hoax" offense,52 reckless driving and hit and run
offenses, 53 involuntary manslaughter,5 4 carrying on an "undignified" political
campaign, 55 disparaging the integrity of the bar and the courts, 0 and failure
by a conscientious objector to report for induction.57
Whatever the merits of the above individual decisions, courts and bar
examiners adhering to the community-standards approach seem to have few
if any criteria to guide them. The United States Supreme Court has held that
the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment re-
quire qualifications for bar admission to have "a rational connection with the
applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law.' 8 This statement may be inter-
preted as a functional approach. However, the courts have continued to state
that fitness to practice law depends on whether a person has good moral
character without articulating how or which aspects of his character are related
to the performance of an attorney's work.59 Perhaps the greatest obstacle in the
development of adequate standards has been the apparent reluctance of the
courts to articulate the specific interests supposedly protected by the good moral
character requirement.60
The California Supreme Court in Hallinanu1 has adopted the functional ap-
proach to the moral character issue. When Terence Hallinan, a recent law
school graduate, applied to the bar he had a record of six arrests for acts of
nonviolent civil disobedience protesting denial of civil rights to minorities,
two arrests in Mississippi voter registration activity, and one arrest in London
while participating in a peace demonstration led by Lord Bertrand Russell.0 2 In
50 People ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Ellis, 101 Colo. 101, 70 P.2d 346 (1937) (attorney sus-
pended and disbarment proceeding continued).
51 Bar Ass'n v. Massengale, 171 Ohio St. 442, 171 N.E.2d 713 (1961) (attorney disbarred).
52 Bar Ass'n v. Smith, 174 Ohio St. 452, 190 N.E.2d 267 (1963) (attorney suspended
indefinitely).
5 3 In re Urias, 65 A.C. 261, 418 P.2d 849, 53 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1966) (attorney suspended).
5 4 In re Alkow, 64 Cal. 2d 838, 415 P.2d 800, 51 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1966) (attorney sus-
pended) ; In re Welansky, 319 Mass. 205, 65 N.E.2d 202 (1946) (attorney disbarred).
55 In re Gorsuch, 76 S.D. 191, 75 N.W.2d 644 (1956) (attorney reprimanded).
56 In re Grimes, 364 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1966) (attorney disbarred); In re Humphrey,
174 Cal. 290, 163 P. 60 (1917) (attorney disbarred); In re Latimer, 11 Ill. 2d 327, 143
N.E.2d 20 (1957), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 355 U.S. 82 (1957) (admission to bar
denied).
5 7 In re Pontarelli, 393 IIl. 310, 66 N.E.2d 83 (1946) (attorney disbarred). See also In re
Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961); In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
58 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957).
59 See, e.g., cases decided after 1957 cited notes 25-57 supra.
60 Lack of specificity is inevitable if the question of good moral character, when applied
as a qualification for membership in the bar, is viewed as a measure of community accept-
ability of a person's conduct. In Iowa State Bar Ass'n v. Kraschel, 148 N.W.2d 621, 627
(Iowa 1967), for example, instead of indicating any relationship between the conduct re-
quiring disbarment and the occupational duties of an attorney, the court merely stated that
the practice of law is a '"ighly esteemed and respected" profession, and that the evidence
showed "an utter breach of faith to the public, to the courts, and to [his] fellow lawyers."
6165 A.C. 485, 421 P.2d 76, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1966).
62Id. at 493-95, 421 P.2d at 82-84, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 234-36.
[Vol. 55: 899
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addition, he was involved in nine fist fights between the ages of 16 and 27.63
All this was urged as establishing a lack of the requisite good moral character.
Examining petitioner's civil disobedience, the court noted that all of the
demonstrations in which the applicant had engaged were peaceful, that the
sincerity of his beliefs and high motivation were unchallenged, and that his
sentiments on nonviolent disobedience were shared "not only by large numbers
of idealistic youth . . . but also by some legal scholars and other eminent
people."6 4 The court then held that, to the extent that acts of civil disobedience
involve violations of the law, "criminal prosecution, not exclusion from the
bar, is the appropriate means of punishing such offenders." 65 The court
specifically distinguished a group of admission cases in which "the fraudulent
acts charged . . . unlike the subject acts committed by petitioner, necessarily
impair the basic objects of the legal profession,"66, and directed the bar to limit
its inquiries into an applicant's character "to assurance that, if admitted, he
will not obstruct the administration of justice or otherwise act unscrupulously
in his capacity as an officer of the court."67 Turning to petitioner's fist fights,
the court again strongly emphasized the same functional approach: "The
question is not whether petitioner's conduct can be condoned. It cannot. The
question is whether such conduct demonstrates that he does not presently
possess the character to be entitled to practice law."68 The court again dis-
tinguished prior admission and disciplinary cases which "involved acts which
bear upon the individual's manifest dishonesty," 69 and concluded that "although
petitioner's past behavior may not be praiseworthy it does not reflect upon his
honesty and veracity nor does it show him unfit for the proper discharge of the
duties of an attorney.
'70
By focusing on criteria relevant to the occupational duties of an attorney,
the California supreme court has limited the previously vague question of good
moral character to one of trustworthiness. The desirability of such limitation
can best be judged by examining the interests which should be protected by
the requirement that a person possess acceptable moral character to be per-
mitted to practice law. The objective of protecting the public can be particu-
larized into the following: (1) protection of those members of the public who
will be the attorney's clients; (2) assurance to the client's adversary 71 that an
03 Id. at 502-10, 421 P.2d at 89-93, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 241-45.
64 Id. at 499-500, 421 P.2d at 86-87, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 238-39.
65Id. at 500, 421 P.2d at 87, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 239. Violations of the law not only raise
questions of moral character, but also pose a potential conffict with the attorney's position
as an "officer of the court" and his commitment to uphold the law. The court did not con-
sider this question. However, civil disobedience is distinguishable from other wilful violations
of the law. A person committing civil disobedience shows disrespect not for the system-he
violates the law openly and is willing to accept the court's judgment-but rather for partic-
ular unjust laws or unjust conditions which he feels require attention. See Wofford, A
Lawyer's Case for Civil Disobedience, LiBEA~ior, Jan. 1961, at 12.
66 65 A.C. at 501, 421 P.2d at 88, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 240.
67 Id. at 500-01, 421 P.2d at 87, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
68 Id. at 509, 421 P.2d at 93, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
69 Id. at 510, 421 P.2d at 93, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
70 Id. at 510, 421 P.2d at 94, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 246.
71 The term "adversary" is here intended to include both a specific individual and the
19671
HeinOnline  -- 55 Cal. L. Rev. 905 1967
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
attorney acting on behalf of his client will not take unfair advantage of the
adversary; and (3) maintenance of an effective judicial system.
An attorney's client has the foremost claim for protection. He entrusts his
personal and financial affairs to an attorney, and it is inconceivable that any-
thing less than the attorney's trustworthiness will assure that the client's
interests are fully protected. At the same time, it does not seem that anything
more is required. Sexual promiscuity, wifebeating, or a quarrelsome nature
may evidence lack of what has traditionally been considered to be good moral
character.7 2 Yet such conduct no more indicates dishonesty or untrustworthiness
in an attorney than its absence assures that honesty or trustworthiness is
present.
The client's adversary has a related interest to be protected. Even though an
attorney's primary duty is to look after his client's interest, the client's adver-
sary is entitled to expect that the methods used will not be unscrupulous.
Again, honesty and trustworthiness will suffice to protect the adversary as well
as the client.
To maintain an effective judicial system, public confidence in the system
must be maintained.7 3 The question here is whether an attorney's conduct,
though unimpeachable in honesty and trustworthiness, may still be such as to
discredit the courts and impair their effectiveness. Perhaps only an empirical
study can fully answer this question. It should not, however, be assumed that
moral or social indiscretions by attorneys will necessarily discredit the judicial
system. First, it should be noted that the typical criticism of the legal profession
has related to professional conduct and duties.7 4 Second, the public tends to
place its confidence in the merchant who delivers what he advertises and the
doctor who can heal. There is no reason to suppose that the public will lose
confidence in a judicial system which affords it justice because some of its
members commit social or moral indiscretions in their personal affairs.7r
Moreover, while an attorney is considered "an officer of the court," the public
is certainly not unaware of the separation between the judiciary on the one
hand and attorneys, who in their role as attorneys are subject to supervision
by the judiciary, on the other.
76
general public in those cases where there is a conffict between a client's interest and the
interest of the community.
72 See text accompanying 7-9 supra.
73 See note 17 supra.
7 4 See, e.g., J. BENNETT, OumAws xx Swivmr CiANms (1958) ; N. DACEY, How To Avon)
PROBATE (1965); CHAnxS DiOcxaxs, BL.Ax HOUSE (1853); Mayer, Justice, The Law and
the Lawyer, TBE SATURDAY EvE=Gx POST, Feb. 26, 1966, at 36; letter to the editors of
TiE, note 81 infra.
75 That a measure is needed "to protect the public" is a favorite rallying cry for
proponents of various interests. However, the public is not as unsophisticated as the frequent
appearance of this insistent imperative implies. In refusing to disbar an attorney for con-
ducting an "undignified" campaign for political office, the Supreme Court of South Dakota
said: "The electors of the Fifth judicial Circuit like the American people as a whole are
politically mature and have had much experience in weighing statements made in an election
campaign. The name calling, the unfair charges, the innuendoes and the destructive criticisms
so characteristic of an election contest are not taken too seriously by the voters." In re
Gorsuch, 76 S.D. 191, 199, 75 N.W.2d 644, 649 (1956). See also notes 82-84 infra.
76 The courts often state that an attorney is "an officer of the court." See text accom-
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As for the notion that the "dignity and prestige of the legal profession" is
itself an interest to be protected, 77 there does not appear to be any more reason
for allowing the legal profession to establish a qualifying standard based on
"dignity and prestige" than for plumbers or ladies' garment workers, for
example, to do so. To the extent that upholding the "dignity and prestige"
of the legal profession is said to preserve public confidence in the judicial
system, the argument is misconceived. The prestige and dignity of the legal
profession is more directly a result of public confidence in the judicial system
and in the professional integrity of the bar, than vice versa.
In addition, if the bar seeks to make "the lawyer, as well as the Boy
Scout . . clean, reverent, and brave"78 on the belief that this will assure the
bar and judiciary popularity and public approval, the proposition is mis-
directed. The very duties of the legal profession and the courts make it unlikely
that universal popularity or approval of all that they do will ever be attained.
Every time a lawyer wins a case, another loses his. Disgruntled clients are
inevitable. The adversary proceeding itself is not calculated to win friends or
influence people. An attorney is sworn to defend unpopular causes,7 9 and the
courts must render unpopular decisions.8 0 The most competent attorneys incur
the public's disdain whenever they obtain an acquittal of a "guilty" individual
on a ground that the layman can only consider an incomprehensible "techni-
cality" or "loophole." 8' It is futile for attorneys to seek either popularity or
approval by the public beyond what a reputation for integrity in their pro-
fessional conduct will bring. But more important, ambition for public approval
conflicts with the duties of an attorney. If public approval were the ultimate
yardstick, there would have been few attorneys willing to defend such unpopu-
lar causes as those of accused communists during the McCarthy era.8 2 Lack
of rapport between the public and the legal system can only be alleviated
by educating the public. But even this will not eliminate all dissatisfaction.
For even reasonable men will disagree on what does or does not merit ap-
proval.
Restrictive influences limiting the freedom of an individual to enter his
panying note 67 supra. Whatever the total implications of this concept, it would seem that
honesty and trustworthiness are sufficiently adequate character requirements to assure courts
that their officers will not obstruct the administration of justice.
77 See text accompanying notes 17-19 supra.
78 V. Cou=- rax & T. FnqrAN, Tm LAwvzR 3x MODERN SociErY 803 (1966).
71) See ABA CANONs OF PRoFmssioNAL ETrmcs No. 4 and Oath of Admission; CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE § 6068(h) (West 1962).
80 Perhaps the sardonic wit of the nation's newspaper cartoonists, see, e.g., T=, Aug.
5, 1966, at 39, best illustrates the invective directed at the United States Supreme Court as a
result of its recent decisions in the area of criminal procedure.
81 After Time magazine ran an article about Edward Bennett Williams, calling him "the
country's top criminal lawyer," Trin, Feb. 10, 1967, at 66, one of its readers wrote back:
"Legal morality-if it ever existed in the U.S.-is dead, as your story on Edward Bennett
Williams proves. Lawyers are not concerned with the guilt or innocence of their clients but
with what 'mistakes' the police or prosecution have made and what angles can be played
to spring the guy-all in the name of constitutional rights. The result: not a trial to determine
justice, but a game." Tra, Feb. 24, 1967, at 10.
82 Compare the case of Negroes accused of offenses against white women in the southern
states. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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chosen profession often merely reflect the standards of the dominant group in
the profession 83 and represent efforts to force those standards on others84 with
little if any advantage to the public.8 5 Professor Reich complains: "The
organized bar's greater concern with 'ambulance chasing' than with other
ethical failings reflects the dominant group's suspicion of the negligence
lawyer."8 6 While protection of the public has traditionally been a paramount
consideration in bar admission and disciplinary proceedings, the individual's
interest in being allowed to practice law has not been considered an affirmative
value.87 Hallinan specifically recognized that the community has an affirmative
83 Often not only the standards, but initiation of regulatory licensing of an occupation
is traced not to a public-minded legislature, but to the group which is to be regulated. See
W. GEL= o.RN, INDaimuAL Famaom AND GovERN__ =rAL RSTAMauS 109-11 (1965); Monag-
ban, The Constitution and Occupational Licensing in Massachusetts, 41 Bostoin U.L. REv.
157, 166 (1961); Comment, Entrance and Disciplinary Requirements for Occupational
Licenses in California, 14 STAw. L. RIv. 533, 535-37 (1962).
84 See In re Gorsuch, 76 S.D. 191, 75 N.W.2d 644 (1956), where an attempt was made to
disbar an attorney who had conducted an "undignified" campaign for political office. Consider,
also, the emphasis on the "rights" of the members of the profession in the following
questioning of an applicant to the California bar: "'[Y]ou are seeking admission to the
profession and ... we as your prospective colleagues have a right to expect complete candor
from you on this particular question, and . . . if you don't wish to be completely candid
with us then we are justified in saying you don't belong in our profession.' " Konigsberg v.
State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 288 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
85See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 322 Mass. 755, 79 N.E.2d 883 (1948) (advisory
opinion that proposed bill prohibiting cemetery owners from selling monuments for cemetery
lots could not be sustained as a valid exercise of the police power); W. GEriaourX, supra
note 84, at 110:
It is hard to believe ... that legislators are responding to any felt public need when
they agree that florists and beauticians and naturopaths and shorthand reporters and
all the other groupings must first be tested, sifted, and pasteurized-and then be
protected against the competition of upstarts who might like to enter the occupation.
Compare the urging of former Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach that the legal
profession try to meet the needs of the poor by relaxing rules against lawyers soliciting clients
and nonlawyers giving legal advice, N.Y. Times, June 25, 1965, at 15, col. 1, with the suit
by three attorneys to enjoin federally subsidized neighborhood law offices from offering free
legal advice, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1965, at 4, col. 3 (supplementary material on microfilm
following the International Edition of the New York Times during the New York Newspaper
Guild strike). See also Monaghan, supra note 83 at 181; notes 89-90 infra.
86 Reich, The New Property, 73 YA. L.J. 733, 767 (1964). That there are such "other
ethical failings" cannot be questioned. Consider the case of a prosecutor who seeks the
death penalty while withholding evidence favorable to the defendant when introduction of
such evidence would ipso facto result in a lesser punishment, or even an acquittal. Miller v.
Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967); TEiE, March 31, 1967, at 72-73. Not only criminal prosecution,
but disciplinary action by the bar is rare in such cases.87 Recently, however, the individual's interest in earning a livelihood as an attorney
has been accorded increasingly heavier weight in admission proceedings. "A State cannot
exclude a person from the practice of law or from any other occupation in a manner or for
reasons that contravene the Due Process or Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957). Admission
to the bar cannot be denied without the right to confront those who give unfavorable in-
formation against the applicant. Wilner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S.
96 (1963). Nor can the practice of law be conditioned on the relinquishment of a constitu-
tional right. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) (attorney's disbarment for invoking self-
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interest in seeing that every qualified person is admitted to his chosen pro-
fession. 88 This interest of the community has increasing significance in view
of the increased demand for legal services resulting from the United States
Supreme Court rulings on right to representation by counsel8 9 and the Govern-
ment's efforts under the Office of Economic Opportunity to provide legal services
for the poor.90
Considering all of the above, Hallinan's limitation of the character inquiry
to assurance that a person can be trusted to discharge his duties as an attorney,
will protect the valid interests which have in the past been shielded by the
broad criteria of good moral character. Trustworthiness is also sufficiently
definite a standard to remove the arbitrariness inherent in the good moral
character criterion under which even bar examiners admit that the rejection or
acceptance of candidates rests upon "the age, experience, background and
degree of tolerance of each member [of a character investigating committee]
... as well as his physical and mental well being on that day." 91 In the place of
"wise men ' 92 applying their own notions of "natural law as recognized by all
men,")93 California has established an adequate standard which will assure both
protection of the public and uniformity in its application. Hallinan is part of a
trend to eliminate restraints on private conduct by government officials who
dispense employment, licenses, and other forms of "government largess," 94 by
requiring all restrictions to be justified with relevant reasons accompanied by
adequate procedural standards.95
The bar's zeal to protect "the prestige and dignity of the legal profession"
in past disciplinary proceedings, conducted without sufficient standards, has
in some cases perhaps harmed the reputation of the bar rather than helped it.
It is quite discernible that some conduct may have passed uncensored had it
not attracted wide publicity.96 Discipline of attorneys in such cases has led
incrimination privilege of fifth amendment in disciplinary proceeding and refusing to testify
and produce demanded records reversed).
88 65 A.C. at 501, 421 P.2d at 87, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
89 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Some law enforcement officials feel that a
sufficient number of lawyers cannot be made available to meet the Supreme Court require-
ments and that they will forego interrogation of indigent suspects who decline to waive their
rights to have an attorney present. N.Y. Times, June 20, 1966, at 1, col. 2.
SO The American Bar Association has called on all lawyers to cooperate with the Office
of Economic Opportunity in providing legal services to the poor, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1965,
at 52, col. 1, id., Feb. 10, 1965, at 27, col. 1.
91 Green, Procedures for Character Investigations, 35 BAR ExAm=R 10, 14 (1966).
92 Id.
93 Starrs, Considerations on Determination of Good Moral Character, 18 U. D-T. L.J.
295, 306 (1955).
94 "Government largess" is a term used by Professor Reich in his article on the emergence
of government as a major source of wealth in the United States, to describe valuables
dispensed by government: money, benefits, services, contracts, franchises and licenses. Reich,
supra note 86.
95 See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385 U.S.
589 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (state statute requiring every teacher of
a state-supported school to disclose every organization to which he had belonged within the
preceding five years held unconstitutional).
9 8 Thus, a prominent attorney who entered into an adulterous relationship with a war
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one commentator to conclude that "the bar sometimes seems less concerned with
keeping its house clean than with the pretense that it is clean," 7 and that it is
preoccupied "with the pretense [of integrity] rather than the fact of integrity." 8
The Hallinan case itself exemplifies the dangers of remitting determination
of these issues to the bar without adequate restraints on its discretion. The
California supreme court emphasized its displeasure with the bar's eagerness to
impeach petitioner's character. Examining one of the fist fights brought into
the record against the petitioner, apparently a case of self-defense, the court
could only say that it was absurd to urge that the event in any way reflected
on the petitioner's character. 9 The bar also contended that the petitioner
lacked truthfulness because he had failed to disclose that he was an intervener
in a will contest and that he was convicted in England of "blocking a footpath."
The court pointed out the obvious-namely, that in view of the extensive list of
arrests which the petitioner did disclose, his nondisclosure of the two "relatively
unimportant matters could not reasonably have been motivated by the belief
that disclosure would harm his cause," 00-and accepted the petitioner's explana-
tion that he had merely forgotten the two items.
The California supreme court has taken the moral character requirement
out of the visceral realm and adopted a functional approach requiring that an
attorney be trustworthy. The generally accepted doctrine that conviction of
a felony is an absolute bar preventing a person from practicing law' 01 is incon-
sistent with the Hallinan rule since the classification of an offense as a felony
or misdemeanor has no relationship to whether the offense involves elements
of trustworthiness. 0 2 Trustworthiness as a standard will adequately protect the
public by specifically focusing on the relevant criteria. In addition, it can be
applied with a substantial measure of objectivity and will provide less likelihood
that an applicant's admission to the bar will depend on such extraneous factors
as the "degree of tolerance or the physical or mental well-being" of bar com-
mittee members. Under Hallinan, the question whether a person has sufficiently
acceptable character to be allowed to practice law is one of whether he is a safe
person to manage the legal affairs of others.
Donatas Januta
hero's wife and attracted much publicity was disbarred. Grievance Comm. v. Broder, 112
Conn. 269, 152 A. 292 (1930). Similarly, the negligent owner of the Cocoanut Grove night
club who was convicted of involuntary manslaughter for failing to provide adequate safe-
guards against fire as a result of which 491 lives were lost was also disbarred. In re
Welansky, 319 Mass. 205, 65 N.E.2d 202 (1946).
97 Comment, The Imposition of Disciplinary Measures for the Misconduct of Attorneys,
52 CoLu:. L. Rav. 1039, 1051 (1952).
98 1d. Cf. the announcement by the president of the American Bar Association of a
three year study to evaluate the enforcement of legal ethics and the concern with "how to
emphasize the need for stronger discipline without implying that the legal profession is
corrupt." N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1967, at 21, col. 1.
99 65 A.C. at 503, 421 P.2d at 89, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 241.
100 65 A.C. at 512, 421 P.2d at 95, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
101 See text accompanying note 24 supra..
102 See, e.g., "A felony is a crime which is punishable with death or by imprisonment in
the state prison. Every other crime is a misdemeanor." CAL. P=NA. CoDE § 17 (West Supp.
1966).
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CONSTITU OTONAL LAW: First Amendment Right of Association for High School
Student-Robinson v. Sacramento City Unified School District (Cal. App.
1966).
A California statute makes it illegal for pupils in public elementary or
secondary schools to join "any secret fraternity, sorority, or club, wholly or
partly formed from the membership of pupils attending the public schools."'
The Sacramento Board of Education promulgated a rule providing for enforce-
ment of the statute through suspension or expulsion of pupils who join such
forbidden organizations. 2 Judy Robinson, a high school student and member
of a sorority, the "Manana Club," challenged the rule; she claimed that the
school board exceeded its delegated powers in issuing the rule and that the rule
infringed her constitutional rights. In Robinson v. Sacramento City Unified
School District,8 the District Court of Appeal upheld the school board's action,
reversing the trial court which had held the rule "void as applied to the plain-
tiff.")
4
The appellate court held that the school board rule was authorized by the
terms of the statute; 5 the court therefore found the plaintiff to be challenging
the statute itself rather than the rule.6 The plaintiff made constitutional objec-
tions based on the first and fourteenth amendments.7 The court, however, con-
centrated on the plaintiff's first amendment challenge.
1 CA.. Enuc. CODE § '10604 (West 1960). The statute exempts some student groups:
"Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent any pupil from joining the order of
the Native Sons of the Golden West, Native Daughters of the Golden West, Foresters of
America, or other kindred organizations not directly associated with the public schools of
the State.' Id. About half the states have similar statutes. A. FiowERs & E. BoLwz=R, LAW
AND PuPIL CONMO, 12 (1964). See, e.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. § 123-21-18 (1963); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 72-5311 (1964); ORE. Rav. STAT. § 336.610 (1965).
2 The rule reads in part as follows: "No pupil .. . shall join . . . any fraternity,
sorority, or other nonschool club which is of such a nature as to engender an undemocratic
spirit in the pupils of the public schools of the district .... membership in which . . is
perpetuated by taking in members from the pupils enrolled in the public schools on the basis
of the selection and decision of its own members. (a.) Nothing in this rule shall be construed
to prohibit any pupil from joining the order of the Native Sons of the Golden West, Native
Daughters of the Golden West, Foresters of America, or other kindred organizations not
directly associated with the public schools of this State; or from joining youth dubs and
organizations sponsored by recognized churches, adult fraternal societies or service dubs (such
as Masons, Elks, Rotary, etc.) not directly associated with the public schools of this State, or
nationally known youth movements and groups organized for citizenship training and physical
development (such as YMCA, YWCA, Boy Scouts of America, Girl Scouts, Camp Fire Girls,
etc.)." Cited in Robinson v. Sacramento City Unified School Dist., 245 A.C.A. 311, 313-14
n.1, 53 Cal. Rptr. 781, 783 n.1 (1966).
3 245 A.C.A. 311, 53 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1966).
4 Id. at 313, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 782.
5 The court held that the term "secret" in the statute -was intended by the legislature to
refer to the dements of social exclusiveness and self-perpetuating membership traditionally
associated with high school fraternities. The school board was therefore authorized to regulate
clubs not secret in the strict sense. Id. at 318, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 786.
old. at 323, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 789.
7The plaintiff asserted violations of the first (free assembly) and fourteenth (due
process and equal protection) amendments of the United States Constitution and comparable
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The plaintiff characterized regulation of membership in nonschool clubs as
a violation of her first amendment freedoms of assembly and association. The
court met the challenge with the following statement:
The First Amendment guarantee of the right of free assembly as applied to adults
(or even to college students, concerning whose rights under the circumstances here
involved we express no opinion) is not involved here. Nor do we assert that public
school pupils in secondary schools have no constitutional rights. Here the school
board is not dealing with adults but with adolescents in their formative years.
8
-In discussing thefirst amendment challenge, the court measured the statute by
due process rather than first amendment standards.9 The statute was directed
toward a legitimate end-the operation of the public school system. Regulation
of high school sororities had a reasonable relation to that end since the legis-
lature had found such sororities "to engender an undemocratic spirit of caste,
to promote cliques, and to foster a contempt for school authority."' 0 Therefore,
the court upheld the statute.
The Robinson case in its result is consistent with virtually all of the reported
high school fraternity cases.." Whether or not there is a state statute on the
provisions of the California Constitution. This Note is limited to discussion of the first
amendment issues.
The plaintiff's equal protection challenge was based on the exemptions granted to some
student organizations by both the rule and the statute. See notes 1-2 supra. While the
fraternity statute was upheld against an equal protection challenge in Bradford v. Board of
Educ., 18 Cal. App. 19, 121 P. 929 (1912), the school board rule seems clearly discriminatory.
Although the evil at which the rule is directed is the element of self-perpetuating membership
in fraternities, youth clubs sponsored by service clubs like the Masons are exempted. Many
of these clubs-e.g., Rainbow Girls, DeMolay, job's Daughters--have all the characteristics
of fraternities, including self-perpetuating membership. Brief for Respondent at 7-8, Robinson
v. Sacramento City Unified School District, 245 A.C.A. 311, 53 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1966). A
clas3sification unrelated to the purpose of the rule clearly violates the equal protection clause.
Canon v. Justice-Court,-61 Cal.-2d 446, 461, 393 P.2d 428, 436, 39 Cal. Rptr. 228, 236 (1964).
If the school has the right to regulate such clubs, it must do so even-handedly and cannot
direct its action only at those groups which it considers undesirable. Cf. Danskin v. San Diego
Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 545, 171 P.2d 885, 891 (1946). The equal protection
defect in the statute might be cured easily by omitting some of the exemptions; such amend-
ment would not solve the first amendment problems.
8 245 A.C.A. at 324; 53 Cal. Rptr. at 789-90.
9 Id. at 323, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 789. In applying the due process test, the court quoted from
an economic regulation case, Allied Properties v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control,
53 Cal. 2d 141, 146, 346 -P.2d 737, 739 (1959): "[Tlhe inquiry of the court is limited to
determining whether the object of the statute is one for which that power may legitimately
be invoked and, if so, whether the statute bears a reasonable and substantial relation to the
object sought to be attained." Economic regulation and regulation in the first amendment
area, however, are usually treated quite differently by the courts. "The right of a State to
regulate, for example, a public utility may well include, so far as the due process test is con-
cerned, power to impose all of the restrictions which a legislature may have a 'rational basis'
for adopting. But freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship may not be
infringed on such slender grounds. They are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave
and immediate danger to interests which the State may lawfully protect." West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
l0 Bradford v. Board of Educ., 18 Cal. App. 19, 23, 121 P. 929, 931 (1912).
11 E.g., Satan Fraternity v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 156 Fla. 222, 22 So. 2d 892 (1945);
Sutton v. Board of Educ., 306 Ill. 507, 138 N.E. 131 (1923); Steele v. Sexton, 253 Mich. 32,
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subject, school boards may pass rules regulating public school membership in
fraternities and sororities. 12 In general, school boards have very broad powers
of control over the activities of pupils in the public schools.13 Pupil conduct
outside school hours or school grounds is not necessarily beyond the jurisdiction
of the school board; the board need find only that the regulated conduct is
"detrimental to [the school's) good order, and to the welfare and advancement
of the pupils therein." 14 As long as school board regulations have some relation-
ship to the operation of the schools and are not clearly arbitrary, courts will
not invalidate them.15
Unlike previous fraternity regulation cases,'0 Robinson assumed that the
protection of the first amendment extends to high school students. 17 The court
234 N.W. 436 (1931); Burkitt v. School Dist. No. 1, 195 Ore. 471, 246 P.2d 566 (1952).
Contra, Wright v. Board of Educ., 295 Mo. 466, 246 S.W. 43 (1922) (regulation invalid
as interference with parental control). See generally A. FLOWERS & E. BoLMEIRR, LAW AND
PUpLr. CONTROL 11-43 (1964); Annot., 27 A.L.R. 1074 (1923).
12 The existence of a statute outlawing high school fraternities means courts will be
very reluctant to interfere with school board regulation of such clubs. "[ilt must be pre-
sumed, from the enactment of a valid statute declaring such societies illegal, that they are
the source of evils which need to be eradicated." Burkitt v. School Dist. No. 1, 195 Ore. 471,
481, 246 P.2d 566, 571 (1952). The two cases in which school board regulations were invali-
dated in part or as a whole involved states without specific antifraternity statutes. Wilson v.
Abilene Independent School Dist., 190 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) (membership not
regulable during school vacation); Wright v. Board of Educ., 295 Mo. 466, 246 S.W. 43
(1922).
13 Statutes delegating rulemaking power to school boards are written in very general
terms. See, e.g., CAL. EDUc. CODE § 10604 (West 1960): "The governing board of any school
district may make and enforce all rules and regulations needful for the government and
discipline of the schools under its charge. Any governing board shall enforce the provisions of
this section by suspending, or, if necessary, expelling a pupil in any elementary or secondary
school who refuses or neglects to obey any such rules or regulations."
14 O'Rourke v. Walker, 102 Conn. 130, 136, 128 A. 25, 26 (1925).
1Pugsley v. Sellmeyer, 158 Ark. 247, 250 S.W. 538 (1923); Fertich v. Michener, 111
Ind. 472, 11 N.E. 605 (1887); Board of Directors v. Green, 147 N.W.2d 854 (Iowa 1967).
The reasonableness of a rule is a question of law for the court. McLeod v. State, 154 Miss. 468,
122 So. 737 (1929). The court will not review the findings of the school board as to facts,
even if the pupil contends he was not guilty of the proscribed conduct, "except where fraud,
corruption, oppression or gross injustice is palpably shown ... ." Smith v. Board of Educ.,
182 IlI. App. 342, 347 (1913).
16 A first amendment challenge has occasionally been raised in such cases but has been
dismissed without discussion as irrelevant. See, e.g., Isgrig v. Srygley, 210 Ark. 580, 197
S.W.2d 39 (1946); Burkitt v. School Dist. No. 1, 195 Ore. 471, 246 P.2d 566 (1952).
17 Several recent cases involving high school regulation of student expression rather than
association agree with Robinson in assuming that the first amendment protects high school
students. Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966); Blackwell v. Issaquena County
Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Dist.,
258 F. Supp. 971 (S.D. Iowa 1966). In the Burnside case the court struck down a rule for-
bidding students to wear SNCC (Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee) buttons to
school; the court held that wearing the buttons was the silent communication of an idea and
was protected by the first amendment. In Blackwell a similar rule was upheld because the
conduct of the students created a serious disturbance in the school. The court in Tinker
upheld a rule prohibiting the wearing of armbands as a protest against the Vietnam war; the
opinion stated that the interest in free expression was outweighed by the possibility of a
hostile reaction from other students which would disrupt the classroom.
19671
HeinOnline  -- 55 Cal. L. Rev. 913 1967
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
concluded that first amendment rights of high school students may be abridged
if there is any rational basis for the state's regulatory action. State regulations
interfering with first amendment rights normally must be justified by a com-
pelling state interest1 8 and must be drawn as narrowly as possible to avoid
unnecessary restriction of protected rights.19 Special procedural safeguards may
be required to minimize the restrictive effect of the regulation ° Robinson, by
requiring only a rational state interest to justify regulation of student first
amendment rights, eliminates the special protection usually given to these "pre-
ferred" substantive rights. The main question in the case, therefore, is why first
amendment rights lose their "preferred" status when high school students are
involved.
The basis of the holding in Robinson is unclear; there are several possible
explanations for the court's failure to analyze the plaintiff's right of association
challenge in terms of a "preferred" right. This Note will examine some of the
unarticulated reasons which may be behind the court's terse statement that
"[t]he First Amendment guarantee of the right of free assembly as applied to
adults . .. is not involved here," 2 1 and which may help to explain special treat-
ment of student rights in general.
First, the court's reference to "adolescents in their formative years" and
the right of association "as applied to adults" 22 may indicate reliance on the
parens patriae doctrine, applicable to the state, or the in loco parentis doctrine,
applicable to schools, which permit those entities to disregard some constitu-
tional limitations in dealing with children 2 3 Second, the court may have con-
cluded that although there is a first amendment right of association and assem-
bly, that right does not include the kind of student association involved in
Robinson. Third, the court may have been reluctant to undertake the extensive
intervention in school administration which would result from the detailed judi-
cial review required for "preferred" first amendment rights. Finally, the court
may have chosen to rely on precedents holding fraternity regulation valid 24
rather than to undertake the development of new tests which the special nature
of the high school situation would require if student first amendment rights were
all treated as "preferred."
Although the Robinson court did not rely specifically on the parens patriae
doctrine, by referring to "adolescents in their formative years" 25 it implied that
the plaintiff's age made the application of conventional first amendment tests2"
to the fraternity statute unnecessary. The parens patriae doctrine, which gives
the state special power to regulate children in a parental rather than govern-
18NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
19 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Fort v. Civil Service Comrn'n, 61 Cal. 2d 331,
392 P.2d 385, 38 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1964).
20 See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
21 245 A.CA. at 324, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 789-90.
2 2 1d.
23 See text accompanying notes 22-44 infra.
2 4 See cases cited note 11 supra.
25 245 A.CA. at 324, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 790.
26 See text accompanying notes 18-20 supra.
[Vol. 55: 911
HeinOnline  -- 55 Cal. L. Rev. 914 1967
NOTES
mental capacity,2 7 would enable it to disregard first amendment restrictions on
the state's power to regulate adults.
This parental relationship is illustrated by juvenile court acts; such acts
allow the state, like the parent, to deprive the child of liberty without assuring
him specific procedural rights.28 Unrestricted by particular procedural demands,
the juvenile court is theoretically concerned with the needs of the child; its aims
are guidance and rehabilitation rather than punishment. 29 Even when it is in-
carcerating a child in reform school, the juvenile court asserts that it is helping
the child, not punishing him in a criminal sense.80
School board regulations designed to govern all the pupils in a given school
district do not represent the kind of individual, parental treatment administered
in a juvenile court as a substitute for constitutional procedural guarantees. The
general parens patriae power of the state cannot explain a disregard of first
amendment protection when the state is not acting as a substitute parent but
is merely regulating the child in the exercise of its general police power. Unlike
the juvenile courts, which exert their power only over neglected or delinquent
children,81 the schools do not base their jurisdiction over children on a showing
that individual parents are caring for their children inadequately.82 In passing
compulsory education laws, the state takes over the function of educating all
children in order to further its own economic and political well being,83 regard-
less of any individual parent's ability to educate his own children adequately.
The state's special power over children, however, is not limited to situations
in which it acts as a substitute parent; the parens patriae power also includes
a special kind of paternalistic police power over children based on their apparent
inability to protect themselves from certain evils.3 4 Child labor laws85 and special
2 7 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Note, The Parens Patriae Theory
and Its Effect on the Constitutional Limits of Juvenile Court Powers, 27 U. PxrT. L. Rxv.
894, 907 (1966).
28 Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 A. 198 (1905). The United States Supreme
Court recently held, however, that the fourteenth amendment requires that state courts afford
juveniles certain specific rights: adequate notice of hearings; notice of the right to counsel and
appointment of counsel for indigents; the privilege against self-incrimination. In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1 (1967).
29 United States v. Kent, 383 U.S. 541, 554-55 (1965). The case illustrates the tendency
to question the assertion of "parental authority" as a justification for depriving children of
procedural rights in juvenile court.
30 Harling v. United States, 295 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
81 "Every statute which is designed to give protection, care, and training to children, as
a needed substitute for parental authority and performance of parental duty, is but a recogni-
tion of the duty of the state, as the legitimate guardian and protector of children, where other
guardianship fails." Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 56-57, 62 A. 198, 201 (1905).
82 Home instruction given by parents may be equal to or superior to the instruction
given in accredited schools, but that will not excuse failure to comply with compulsory educa-
tion laws. People v. Turner, 121 Cal. App. 2d 861, 263 P.2d 685 (Super. Ct. App. Dep't 1953).
83 People ex rel. Vollmar v. Stanley, 81 Colo. 276, 255 P. 610 (1927) ; Stephens v. Bongart,
15 NJ. Misc. 80, 189 A. 131 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1937).
84 See generally Note, "For Adults Only": The Constitutionality of Governmental Film
Censorship by Age Classification, 69 YALE LJ. 141, 146 (1959).
85 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1943).
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obscenity legislation for children86 are constitutional despite a restrictive effect
on first amendment freedoms which would be invalid if adult rights were in-
volved. It may be argued that compulsory education laws represent the exercise
of such a power; 37 children may be educated for their own good because they
cannot yet assess for themselves the necessity for an education. Regulation of
student conduct within the school context, however, does not usually represent
this kind of state interest; school regulations reflect a school's need to control
students in order to carry out its own educational function. Such regulations
are not imposed on children for their own protection but are comparable to
laws required to maintain order in public places.
A school may not disregard first amendment protection when school regu-
lations do not reflect a child's special need to be protected. However, during
school hours and on school grounds, the teacher is traditionally said to stand
in loco parentis to the child 38 While the parens patriae doctrine refers to the
special regulatory power of the state over all children, the in loco parentis doc-
trine confers parental authority on anyone assuming responsibility for a child's
careP9 In the school context, the in loco parentis doctrine was originally invoked
as a justification for the infliction of corporal punishment by a teacher, and
the phrase is still most often used in that context.40 However, the legal fiction
that the teacher stands in the place of the parent for the purpose of administer-
ing reasonable punishment in order to maintain discipline was expanded by the
courts to justify the school in regulating student morals and social life just as
a parent would.4 1 The Robinson court may have felt that this special school-
pupil relationship reinforced the state's general parens patriae power to dis-
regard some constitutional restrictions when regulating children.
However, the idea that the parent has delegated his authority to the school
for the purpose of maintaining discipline, or that the school has "'inherent'
powers arising out of the similarity of the teacher's role to the parents, ' '42 can-
not transform the nature of the school as a public agency. It is clear that the
public school is subject to constitutional commands not applicable to parents.
The school may not give religious instruction, while the parent may.48 The
88 See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964) (plurality opinion), which cites with
approval a Rhode Island case, State v. Settle, 90 R.I. 195, 156 A.2d 921 (1959), upholding
special obscenity legislation for children. See also Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas,
366 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1966) noted infra, at 926.
3 7 But see Fischler v. Municipal Court, 233 Cal. App. 2d 780, 43 Cal. Rptr. 882 (1965),
in which the court cited compulsory education law cases to support its rejection of the adult
plaintiff's constitutional challenge to a court order compelling him to attend traffic school.
There was no suggestion that the child and adult situations differed.
38Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114 (1859). See generally Comment, Private Government on
the Campus-Judicial Review of University Explusions, 72 YArm L.J. 1362, 1367-72 (1963).
39 Richards v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 208, 212 (N.D. W. Va. 1950); State ex rel.
Gilroy v. Superior Court, 37 Wash. 2d 926, 933, 226 P.2d 882, 885 (1951).
4 0 See, e.g., Andreozzi v. Rubano, 145 Conn. 280, 141 A.2d 639 (1958); Eastman v.
Williams, 124 Vt. 445, 207 A.2d 146 (1965).
4 1 See, e.g., John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1925) ; Richardson
v. Braham, 125 Neb. 142, 249 N.W. 557 (1933).
42 Comment, Private Government on the Campus-Judicial Review of University Expul-
sions, 72 YArE L.J. 1362, 1367 (1963).
48 School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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school may not maintain racial segregation,4 4 but the parent can control his
child's associations. Although the majority of parents in a community may wish
religious instruction in the schools or favor racial segregation, the schools may
not constitutionally act in these areas as delegates of parental authority. Simi-
larly, the mere statement that a school is in locol parentis cannot dissolve the
restrictions which the first amendment places on all public agency actions that
abridge first amendment rights.
When the school goes beyond disciplining an individual child for misbe-
havior by subjecting him to general regulations that prescribe standards for
student conduct, it implements an educational policy chosen by a majority of
the community acting through the legislature and through elected school boards.
These regulations, which may regulate dress and haircuts,45 as well as student
expression and association,46 are imposed on most school age children because
of the state's near monopoly in education. Arguably, students represent the kind
of politically powerless group whose rights deserve special protection by the
courts47 since community values may be imposed on them before they have a
say in formulating those values.48 The first amendment was designed as a pro-
tection against the very kind of majority power represented by the school's
enforcement of community standards.49
Since the legal model for the modern school is not the parent but "the social
service agency and the public building complex,"50 abridgment of student first
amendment rights must be justified by the kind of state interest which justifies
abridgment of adult rights of free speech. The due process test used in Robinson
does not give adequate protection to student rights of expression and associa-
tion; the abridgment of such "preferred" rights can only be justified by a
compelling state interest. The compelling state interest in the maintenance of a
public school system may at times justify extensive regulation of student rights.
However, the school may have a variety of interests which would be furthered
by restriction of first amendment rights. In each case, the court should balance
the individual right against the school interest with which it conflicts. Such a
balancing test would protect essential interests of the school while allowing
44 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
45 Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 261 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Tex. 1966);
Leonard v. School Comm., 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965). See generally Comment,
The Right to Dress and Go to School, 37 U. CoLo. L. REV. 492 (1965).
46 Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966) ; Satan Fraternity v. Board of Pub.
Instruction, 156 Fla. 222, 22 So. 2d 892 (1945).
47 See United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ; Comment, Private
Government on the Campus-Judicial Review of University Expulsions, 72 YALE L.. 1362,
1390 (1963).
48 "Today, as always, the school is the instrument through which society acculturates
people into consensus before they become old enough to resist it as effectively as they could
later." E. FRIEDENERG, COINTG or AGE n A=RicA 170 (Vintage ed. 1967).
49 "The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and offi-
cials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts." West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
50 Linde, Campus Law: Berkeley Viewed from Eugene, 54 CA . Rlv. 40, 64 (1966).
The quotation refers to a public university, but it seems equally applicable to the modem
high school.
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maximum freedom to individual rights which interfere with only a weak or
colorable school interest.5 '
It is possible, however, that the Robinson court used a due process test to
judge the fraternity statute because it concluded that the "preferred" first
amendment right of association did not include the kind of student association
to which the plaintiff belonged. The right of association asserted in Robinson
has been afforded first amendment protection in some cases, 2 but it is still not
dear whether "a general freedom to form associations is necessarily implicit in
the language of the first amendment.153 The statement in Robinson that "the
First Amendment guarantee of the right of free assembly as applied to adults
. .. is not involved here" can be explained in two ways. The court may have
believed that no purely social club, for adults or students, was protected by the
first amendment right of association. On the other hand, the court may have
concluded that the first amendment does protect social clubs for adults, but not
for high school students, because of the state's special power over children. The
first explanation of the court's holding would make its use of the due process
test legitimate. 54 However, if social clubs are protected by the first amendment,
the court should have used a balancing test to determine whether the school's
interest in fraternity regulation justified abridgment of the plaintiff's "preferred"
right of association.
The first amendment right of association has traditionally been discussed
in the context of the right to form and belong to political parties or groups;6r5
as such, it has been described as "a byproduct of many constitutional guarantees,
such as the rights of petition and assembly, the rights of free speech and free
press, and the right to vote." 56 The concept of a more general right of associa-
tion has emerged in the holdings and discussion of recent Supreme Court cases.5
However, these cases have been interpreted as meaning only that the first amend-
ment protects membership in associations formed to further rights which are
51 A balancing test for first amendment freedoms is used in NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449 (1958); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). For
comment favoring use of the test see W. MENDELSON, JUSTICS BLACK AND FRANK lURTER:
CoNLIcr IN THE COURT (1961); Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960
Sup. CT. Rxv. 75. For criticism of the test see T. EsmRsox, TOWARD A GEaEAL THEORY Or
TE FIRST A.xmEr 53-56 (1967); Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71
YALE L.J. 1424 (1962).52 fBrotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1
(1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 499 (1958).
See generally D. FEw.sm , THE CONSTITUTIOrAL R GnT or AssocIAToI (1963); Note,
Freedom of Association: Constitutional Right or Judicial Technique?, 46 VA. L. Rxv. 730
(1960).
53 Developments in the Law-Judicial Control of Private Associations, 76 HARV. L. REv.
983, 1057 (1963).
54 The right to travel cases suggest, however, that there are some personal rights not
protected by the first amendment which the state must regulate more narrowly than it does
economic rights. See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Kent v. Dulles,
357 U.S. 116 (1958). The right of association is arguably such a personal right. See Emerson,
Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1, 20-21 (1964).
55 See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
56 D. F LraiA, TnE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF AssOCIATiON 38 (1963).
57 See cases cited note 52 supra.
[Vol. 55: 911
HeinOnline  -- 55 Cal. L. Rev. 918 1967
NOTES
themselves protected by the first amendment.58 Thus, the right of association
is protected when it is association "for the advancement of beliefs and ideas."59
The promotion of litigation in NAACP v. Button was protected because, for a
minority group, "association for litigation may be the most effective form of
political association.1 60
The right of association, however, is not necessarily limited to political
groups. A recent case protected association for litigation under the first amend-
ment when it was not a form of political association, but merely involved per-
sonal injury litigation.6' Finally, the Court's opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut
62
discusses in broad terms the right of association protected by the first amend-
ment:
The right of "association," like the right of belief .. . is more than the right to
attend a meeting; it includes the right to express one's attitudes or philosophies by
membership in a group or by affiliation with it or by other lawful means. Asso-
ciation in that context is a form of expression of opinion; and while it is not
expressly included in the First Amendment its existence is necessary in making the
express guarantees fully meaningful.
63
Such language, and dicta in other cases, 64 suggest that membership in a social
club may well be protected by the first amendment right of association.6 5
The right of association like other first amendment rights should be restricted
only to further a strong state interest,66 only in the absence of equally effective
alternative means of protecting the state interest, 67 and only to the extent
necessary to maintain the state interest involved. 68 The right of membership
in a high school club should be evaluated in these terms.
58See Developments in the Law-Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations,
76 HARV. L. Rxv. 983, 1056-57 (1963); Note, Freedom of Association: Constitutional Right
or Judicial Technique?, 46 VA. L. REv. 730, 739-40 (1960).
59 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958).
60 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963).
61 Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1
(1964). The dissenting opinion emphasized that the holding was an extension of the right
of association, distinguishing the case from NAACP v. Button by pointing out that "personal
injury litigation is not a form of political expression, but rather a procedure for the settle-
ment of damage claims." Id. at 10.
62 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
63 Id. at 483.
64See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 507 (1964); Gibson v. Florida
Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 562 (1963) (concurring opinion of Douglas,
65 Outside of a special situation like the school context involved in Robinson, the issue
may rarely arise. "Furthermore, constitutional protection of the bare right to form or join an
association is, as a practical matter, usually more symbolic than real. None of the cases in
which the Supreme Court has hitherto relied upon 'the right of association' has raised the
legal. issues in this naked form." Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expres-
sion, 74 YALUE L.J. 1, 7 (1964).
66 Note I8 supra.
67 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162
(1939). See generally Wormuth & Mirkin, The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative, 9
UTAn L. REV. 254 (1964).
68 Note 19 supra.
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High school membership in fraternities is forbidden for both practical and
ideological reasons.69 The practical school interests at stake are the maintenance
of discipline and the efficient administration of the school.70 Fraternities which
disrupt the operation of the schools are analogous to political demonstrations
in public streets; first amendment rights may be restricted when their exercise
interferes with the rights of others to use public facilities. 71 However, the actual
interference caused by the fraternities should be narrowly defined. Disruption
of classroom discipline justifies severe regulatory measures; harassment of
school officials by the disappointed parents of children not admitted to the clubs
may not be a legitimate basis for regulation at all. Inconvenience to adminis-
trators or even general community pressure to abolish the clubs does not justify
total abridgment of a first amendment right.
Even where classroom discipline is involved, the actual relationship between
the clubs and the disturbance should be clarified. If fraternity members do show
contempt for authority, their misconduct may be punished. Abolishing the club
as an entity because of the misbehavior of a few members is based on a concept
of guilt by association which is unacceptable as a reason for abridging first
amendment freedoms.72 If the disruption is caused by the hostility of non-
members, the school should be compelled to regulate the hostile conduct rather
than the protected activity which caused the reaction.73
When the disruptive effect of the fraternities is related to the low morale of
excluded students rather than to overt hostile behavior, it may be questioned
whether the school has a duty to protect its pupils from the unhappy experiences
of nonmembership. 74 The fact that children are emotionally and psychologically
more vulnerable than adults may constitutionally justify greater abridgment of
their first amendment rights, as it does in the obscenity cases.76 However, there
is clearly a difference between regulating children for their own protection and
69 See, e.g., Isgrig v. Srygley, 210 Ark. 580, 197 S.W.2d 39 (1946) ; Bradford v. Board of
Educ., 18 Cal. App. 19, 121 P. 929 (1912). See generally A. FLowERs & E. BoL nmER, LAW
Am PuPsr. CONTROL 13-14 (1964).
7 0 See, e.g., Burkitt v. School Dist. No. 1, 195 Ore. 471, 498, 246 P.2d 566, 578 (1952).
71 See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77
(1949).
72 Cf. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353
(1937).
73 Cf. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); Sellers v. Johnson, 163 F.2d 877
(8th Cir. 1947); Hurwitt v. City of Oakland, 247 F. Supp. 995 (N.D. Cal. 1965). See
generally Note, Freedom of Speech and Assembly: The Problem of the Hostile Audience, 49
CoLum. L. R v. 1118 (1949). But see Tinker v. Independent School Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971,
973 (S.D. Iowa 1966).
74 School attempts to regulate the clubs may merely increase their adverse psychological
effects. "But the youngsters nevertheless know that their relationships are disapproved as
undemocratic and become guilty and defiant about their own exclusiveness; the members
lose, or never develop, confidence in their right to choose their own friends, and their clique
then becomes a more exclusively political instrument than it otherwise would have been."
E. FRIEDENEERO, COMMin Or AGE n AmEiCA 239 (Vintage ed. 1967).
75 See, e.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964) ; Insterstate Circuit, Inc. v. City
of Dallas, 366 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1966). See generally Note, "For Adults Only": The Con-
stitutionality of Government Film Censorship by Age Classification, 69 YArz L.J. 141
(1959).
[Vol. 55: 911
HeinOnline  -- 55 Cal. L. Rev. 920 1967
NOTES
regulating some children for the protection of others. The school should be more
cautious in abridging the rights of the latter.
Schools find fraternities ideologically objectionable, regardless of their actual
psychological impact on other students, because they are exclusive and undemo-
cratic.76 Many states impose a statutory obligation on their schools to teach
"democratic ideals" or "American values" as well as the more traditional aca-
demic subjects; 77 schools interpret this to mean that student activities must be
regulated to reflect these values.7 8 However, it may be argued that even a
statute does not make the teaching of such values in the schools as compelling
a state interest as the provision of a basic education. The state may not con-
stitutionally compel all children to go to public school.7 9 Private schools and,
in some states, home instruction are allowable because the state's major concern
is that its youth be educated, and not that they be educated in one particular
way.80 Maintenance of classroom discipline in order to provide a basic education
represents a more compelling state interest than does the example of democracy
in action provided by not allowing students to have exclusive clubs. Moreover,
democratic ideals may be taught in the classroom by persuasive rather than
coercive means.8 1
Statements by the schools that fraternities are undesirable because they are
"snobbish" or undemocratic suggest the fear some schools may have of appear-
ing to condone discriminatory fraternity practices. Although the problem of
racial discrimination is not explicitly mentioned in cases involving high school
fraternities, the issue has been adjudicated on the college level.8 2 Fraternity
regulation based on the existence of racial discrimination in the clubs is based
on a stronger state interest than mere dislike of exclusiveness since in the for-
mer case the school is implementing the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
8 3
76 See, e.g., Isgrig v. Srygley, 210 Ark. 580, 197 S.W.2d 39 (1946) ; Coggins v. Board of
Educ., 223 N.C. 763, 28 S.E.2d 527 (1944).
77E.g., CAL. EDuc. CODE § 7851 (West Supp. 1966): "Each teacher shall endeavor to
impress upon the minds of the pupils the principles of morality, truth, justice, patriotism,
and a true comprehension of the rights, duties, and dignity of American citizenship, including
kindness towards domestic pets and the humane treatment of living creatures, to teach them
to avoid idleness, profanity, and falsehood, and to instruct them in manners and morals and
the principles of a free government."
78For example, school organizations must be open to all students. E. FEIEDENBERG,
Coammo OF AGE nr A.EmECA 238-39 (Vintage ed. 1967).
79 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
8 0 E.g., People v. Levisen, 404 Ill. 574, 90 N.E.2d 213 (1950); State v. Peterman, 32
Ind. App. 665, 70 N.E. 550 (1904); Commonwealth v. Roberts, 159 Mass. 372, 34 N.E. 402
(1893).
8 1 See, e.g., West Virginia State 33d. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631 (1943);
Reed v. Van Hoven, 237 F. Supp. 48 (WD. Mich 1965).
82 See, e.g., Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 258 F. Supp. 515
(D. Colo. 1966), in which regulation of a discriminatory fraternity was upheld as valid.
83"Any deterrent effect upon the associational activity of individuals not desiring to
join such organizations now open to all races must be considered incidental to the principal
purpose of the state action-elimination of an associational barrier based upon race."
Comment, State Universities and the Discriminatory Fraternity: A Constitutional Analysis,
8 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 169, 188 (1961). But see O'Neil, Reflections on the Academic Senate
19671
HeinOnline  -- 55 Cal. L. Rev. 921 1967
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
The school interests involved in fraternity regulation have been discussed
in their bearing on only one aspect of the right of association-the individual
student's right of membership in an organization. The right of association,
however, includes a variety of associational interests.84 An attempt to prohibit
student membership in a nonschool club may infringe the rights of the asso-
ciation itself or the right of nonstudent members to associate freely with stu-
dents.8 5 School interests which seem compelling when weighed against the rights
of individual student members often will not justify prohibition of student
membership in a group when the prohibition infringes the right of association
of nonstudent or even adult members of the organization.80 As in the case of
racially discriminatory fraternities, the school may have to restrict itself to
regulation of fraternity activities at school, thus minimizing the abridgment of
the right of association of those not connected with the school.
As the discussion above indicates, use of a balancing test requires detailed
analysis of the specific interests asserted by both the individual and the state.
A court's adoption of a due process test may reflect a reluctance to interfere
in the administration of the school. Courts have traditionally shown great defer-
ence to regulation by schools.87 However, it has been shown that the interests
which the school asserts to justify regulation of student rights may not all be of
equal importance to the school's primary function of providing an education. The
provision of an orderly atmosphere in which to carry on the essential task of
educating young students may outweigh the interest in some kinds of expression,
just as the maintenance of order in public streets and buildings sometimes out-
weighs adult rights of free speech.88 In both the above cases, the state interest is
the protection of the rights of other individuals to the undisrupted use of public
facilities. The interest asserted by the school is much weaker when it involves
protecting, not the rights of other students to an uninterrupted education, but
the prestige of the school administration, the school's public relations with
the community, or the convenience of school officials. 80
Resolution, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 88, 93 n.12 (1966): "Had the free speech and association
question been squarely presented (by the plaintiffs who were discriminatory fraternities],
and had it been shown that the undoubtedly laudable purpose of banning racial or religious
discrimination on campus could have been achieved by less drastic means, the university
might have been constitutionally required to regulate rather than abolish the discriminatory
organizations and their offending practices."
84 See generally Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE
L.J. 1, 3-4 (1964).
85 An association may assert both its own rights to a certain level of financial support and
membership and the associational rights of its members. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,
459-60 (1958). An individual member may assert that state action directed at him violates
the associational rights of other members of his association. Gibson v. Florida Legislative
Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
86 School regulations may include within their scope organizations with some adult
members. See, e.g., Holroyd v. Eibling, 116 Ohio App. 440, 188 N.E.2d 797 (1962).
87 Courts assert that more detailed judicial inquiry into the need for various regulations
would result in "confusion detrimental to the . . . efficient operation of our public school
system." Board of Directors v. Green, 147 N.W.2d 854, 858 (Iowa 1967).
88See, e.g., Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77 (1949).
89 Cf. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939): "We are of opinion that the pur-
pose to keep the streets clean and of good appearance is insufficient to justify an ordinance
which prohibits a person rightfully on a public street from handing literature to one willing
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A court's failure to adopt a balancing test may be motivated not only by
reluctance to interfere in school administration, but also by a feeling that
traditional first amendment tests are not really relevant to a high school situa-
tion. The exercise of first amendment rights by high school students clearly
raises different problems from those created by threats to national security or
even large public demonstrations. The special nature of the school environment
and the special ways in which high school students express themselves may
require the courts to develop new criteria for judging student first amendment
rights in general. 90 However, the inconvenience involved in formulating special
tests for students does not justify the court's reliance on a due process standard
which may be satisfied by any vague assertion of a state interest. 91
A brief discussion of student first amendment rights other than the right of
association will illustrate the inadequacy of existing first amendment analyses
when applied to the high school context. Moreover, it will become apparent
that, given the special nature of the high school context, it is often noncom-
municative forms of self-expression like membership in a club which should have
the greatest weight when a "balancing" test is used for student first amendment
rights.
Although regulation of students in schools is analogous to regulation of
public use of public streets and buildings, the situations differ enough that
criteria for the latter regulation are not always applicable to schools. The dis-
tinction between regulation of speech content, which must be justified by a
compelling state interest, and regulation of time, place, and manner of speech,
which need only be reasonable, 92 has little meaning in most school contexts.
Because a school is a controlled environment, school officials could characterize
total prohibition of various kinds of expression on school grounds and during
school hours as a regulation of time, place, and manner. Since speech would still
be unregulated outside the school, the schools might argue that school hours and
grounds were not an appropriate time and place for free expression which inter-
fered with the primary function of the school.93
Similarly, the distinction between protected speech and regulable conduct
does not give adequate protection to speech in a school context.94 All expression
to receive it. Any burden imposed upon the city authorities in cleaning and caring for the
streets as an indirect consequence of such distribution results from the constitutional protec-
tion of the freedom of speech and press." See generally Comment, Private Government on the
Campus-Judicial Review of University Expulsions, 72 YALE L.J. 1362, 1392-95 (1963).
9ODifferent kinds of expression present different problems. Cf. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U. S. 77, 97 (1949) (concurring opinion of Jackson, J.): "The moving picture screen, the
radio, the newspaper, the handbill, the sound truck and the street corner orator have
differing natures, values, abuses and dangers. Each, in my view, is a law unto itself."
91 The standard is met, for example, by a statement that high school fraternities have
"a divisive influence in the school and present difficult problems for the school authorities."
Holroyd v. Eibling, 116 Ohio App. 440, 444, 188 N.E.2d 797, 800 (1962).
92 See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965); Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th
Cir. 1966); O'Neil, Reflections on the Academic Senate Resolution, 54 CAsnF. L. Rzv. 88, 104
(1966).
93 See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971 (S.D. Iowa
1966).
94 For general criticism of this distinction, see Kalven, The Concept of the Public
Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. Rav. 1. Professor Emerson suggests a modified, more
flexible use of the distinction in first amendment cases: "This judgment must be guided by
consideration of whether the conduct partakes of the essential qualities of expression or
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interferes with the functioning of a school and may be described as conduct
regulable in the interest of the primary use of school buildings or of school timeY6
Oral speech is noise which may interfere with classes; written speech must be
distributed through some medium-the student newspaper, posters, leaflets-
which the school might claim should be reserved for school purposes; symbolic
speech-e.g., buttons or armbands-may cause a curious or hostile reaction from
other students which would manifest itself as congestion in the halls, noise, or
disruption of classes.
Because many traditional first amendment cases have involved expression
which posed a threat to state order or security because of its communicated
content,9 6 it is sometimes assumed that expression must communicate ideas in
order to be protected.9 7 When the interest in free expression is balanced against
the interest in order, noncommunicative expression may be characterized as
conduct which is subject to reasonable regulation, or it may be judged to have
little social utility and therefore be given little weight in the balancing process.
However, a high school student may not have available to him the time or
public forum in which to express himself vocally; no vehicles for the written
word may be open to him. The kinds of expression most valuable to him may
be those describable as symbolic expression. Through armbands and buttons
he can express his political and social beliefs;99 through dress and appearance
he may express his sense of individuality and his chosen style of life; 10 through
action. In the main this is a question of whether the harm attributable to the conduct is
immediate and instantaneous, and whether it is irremediable except by punishing and
thereby preventing the conduct. A second factor is also significant. This is whether the
regulation of the conduct is, as a practical administrative matter, compatible with a workable
system of free expression .... In formulating the distinction between expression and action
there is thus a certain leeway in which the process of reconciling freedom of expression with
other values and objectives can remain flexible." T. E~msoN, TowARD A GEmRAL THEORY
or THE FIRST A.aNDnENT 61 (1967).
95 However, some forms of conduct are protected by the first amendment. See, e.g.,
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (peaceful demonstration); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (association to promote litigation); West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (refusal to salute flag); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88 (1940) (picketing). The explicit guarantee of freedom of assembly in the first amend-
ment also dearly protects conduct.
96See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S.
315 (1951).
97 See Comment, Zoning, Aesthetics, and the First Amendment, 64 CoLum. L. REv. 81,
91 (1964): "Before nonverbal expression is entitled to first amendment protection it must
satisfy [these] requirements. First, a nonverbal symbol initially without a fixed 'meaning' in
the public mind must acquire such a meaning. Second, the intellectual content of the symbol
must be of a type that is traditionally accorded first amendment protection." But cf. Weaver
v. Jordan, 64 Cal. 2d 235, 242, 411 P.2d 289, 294, 49 Cal. Rptr. 537, 542 (1966): The first
amendment encompasses "amusement and entertainment as well as the exposition of ideas."
98 Some kinds of symbolic expression are dearly protected by the first amendment. See
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (flag salute); Stromberg v.
California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (red flag); Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966)
(SNCC buttons); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971 (S.D.
Iowa 1966). See generally Comment, Zoning, Aesthetics, and the First Amendment, 64
CoLvtr. L. Rav. 81 (1964).
99 See Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966); Tinker v. Des Moines Inde-
pendent School Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971 (S.D. Iowa 1966).
100 See Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 261 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Texas 1966).
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his choice of associations he may define his interests and his attitudes toward
others.101 These forms of expression are important to the individual; they create
little interference with the rights of others. 10 2 The assertions of the school that
such forms of expression have a disruptive effect is rarely supported by any
evidence; 10 3 moreover, in the first amendment area the school has some duty to
attempt to regulate the "hostile audience" causing the disturbance before pro-
hibiting the expression itself.10 4
An attempt to articulate the reasons underlying the Robinson court's failure
to treat the case before it as one involving a "preferred" first amendment right
reveals a number of facts which might have influenced the court's holding. The
language of the decision does not indicate which, if any, of the explanations
offered here was controlling; all of the factors discussed must be considered by
any court asked to deal with student first amendment rights. The first amend-
ment is designed to protect individual rights against a society attempting to
regulate them. The right assaulted in a specific case may seem trivial, but the
larger question remains of where the line should be drawn in state regulation of
the individual. Reliance on the due process test leaves schools free to abridge
the first amendment rights of students whenever there is a remote possibility of
disruption or whenever the student's behavior or values seem incompatible with
the values being taught by the school.
Since the state's interest in the public schools is clearly compelling, the
courts can protect student first amendment rights adequately only by requiring
a school to justify its regulations in terms of narrowly defined and specific
interests. Where the interest asserted is trivial or peripheral to the school's pri-
mary educational function, a court's use of a balancing test should result in the
protection of the challenged first amendment right. Neither the parental analogy
nor administrative convenience present compelling reasons for failing to give high
school students such special protection. Indeed, the school's duty to teach




For criticism of dress and appearance regulations, see E. FRiEDENBERO, CoaMo or AGE nH
AaraucA 4647 (Vintage ed. 1967); Comment, The Right to Dress and Go to School, 37
U. Coxo. L. Rav. 492 (1965).
10 1 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
102 In protecting student first amendment rights, courts usually emphasize that the exer-
cise of the right is not disruptive. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
630 (1943) (refusal to salute flag) ; Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966) (wearing
SNCC button); Sheldon v. Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ariz. 1963) (refusal to stand for
anthem).
10 3 See Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966) (no evidence of discipline
problem); Sheldon v. Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ariz. 1963) (evidence "speculative at
best").
104 Cf. Terminielo v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) ; Sellers v. Johnson, 163 F.2d 877 (8th
Cir. 1947); Hurwitt v. City of Oakland, 247 F. Supp. 995 (N.D. Cal. 1965). See generally
Note, Freedom of Speech and Assembly: The Problem of the Hostile Audience, 49 Coa.u-:.
L. REv. 1118 (1949). But see Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Dist., 258 F. Supp.
971, 973 (S.D. Iowa 1966).
105 "That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protec-
tion of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at
its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere
platitudes." West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Obscenity-Children's Film Classification Statute Held
Constitutional-Interstate Circuit, Incorporated v. City of Dallas (5th Cir.
1966).
A Dallas, Texas city ordinance required all motion pictures exhibited in
Dallas to be classified as "suitable" or "not suitable" for young persons.2 The
ordinance prohibited theater owners from showing children not only obscene films
but also those featuring "brutality," "criminal violence" and "depravity" in a
manner likely to incite juvenile delinquency.3 Exhibitors were required to submit
a summary of the film's plot and a proposed classification to the Dallas Motion
Picture Classification Board. The Board in its discretion could view any film. 4
Exhibiting any film in Dallas that had not been classified by the Board, or
knowingly6 admitting children to a picture classified "not suitable for children"
violated the ordinance7 Dallas motion picture exhibitors challenged the consti-
tutionality of the ordinance in Interstate Circuit, Incorporated v. City of Dallas.6
The court of appeals in Interstate Circuit held that Dallas could constitu-
tionally enact a children's film classification statute9 and that a film which is not
1 DATLs, T x., Rav. ORDINANCES, ch. 46A (1965), reprinted in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v.
City of Dallas, 366 F.2d 590, 602-08 (5th Cir. 1966).
21d. at § 46A-3. "Young person" means anyone under 16. Id. at § 46A-l(d). In Para-
mount Film Distrib. Corp. v. City of Chicago, 172 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Ill. 1959), the district
court held a similar film classification statute invalid on three alternative grounds, one of
which was that a 21 year age limit was unreasonable.
3 "Not suitable for young persons" means:
(1) Describing or portraying brutality, criminal violence or depravity in such
a manner as to be, in the judgment of the Board, likely to incite or encourage crime
or delinquency on the part of young persons; or (2) Describing or portraying nudity
beyond the customary limits of candor in the community, or sexual promiscuity or
extramarital or abnormal sexual relations in such a manner as to be, in the judgment
of the Board, likely to incite or encourage delinquency or sexual promiscuity on the
part of young persons or to appeal to their prurient interest.
A film shall be considered "likely to incite or encourage" crime, delinquency or
sexual promiscuity on the part of young persons, if, in the judgment of the Board,
there is a substantial probability that it will create the impression on young persons
that such conduct is profitable, desirable, acceptable, respectable, praiseworthy or
commonly accepted. A film shall be considered as appealing to the "prurient interest"
of young persons, if in the judgment of the Board, its calculated or dominant effect
on young persons is substantially to arouse sexual desire. In determining whether a
film is "not suitable for young persons," the Board shall consider the film as a whole,
rather than isolated portions, and shall determine whether its harmful effects out-
weigh artistic or educational values such film may have for young persons.
DALLAS, Tax., REv. OR1I=ANcES, § 46A-l(f) (1965).:
4 Id. at § 46A-3.
5 Id. at § 46A-4(a) (1).
6 Although the ordinance requires knowledge of the child's age, People v. Tannenbaum,
18 N.Y.2d 268, 220 N.E.2d 783, 274 N.Y.S.2d 131 (1966), held that such a statute need not
constitutionally require knowledge of the child's age.
7 DALLAs, TEx., R V ORDIwANCES, § 46A-4(a) (4-5) (1965).
8366 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1966), petition for cert. filed, 35 U.S.L.W. 3273 (U.S. Jan. 13,
1967) (No. 971, 1966 Term; renumbered No. 42, 1967 Term) (appeal by motion picture
exhibition), petition for cert. filed, id. (U.S. Jan. 16, 1967) (No. 978, 1966 Term; re-
numbered No. 44, 1967 Term) (appeal by City of Dallas).
9366 F.2d at 593-97. The district court, on the authority of Butler v. Michigan,
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obscene under the Supreme Court's obscenity standard for adults' ° may be
obscene for children." However, the court also ruled that the classification
standard, 12 even though it applied only to children, was too broad in allowing
censorship on such nonobscenity grounds as brutality and criminal violence.
Therefore, the court restricted the ordinance to controlling only material obscene
for children.18
The major question presented to the court in Interstate Circuit was whether
the city could censor material for children by using a broad, nonobscenity
standard. Concern exists about the sale to children of material featuring horror,
sadism, brutality, and extreme violence. This is evidenced by the fact that many
states have proscribed dissemination to children of comic books containing
principally illustrated accounts of horror, terror, torture, and criminal violence.
14
Proscription of these materials is defended on the theory that the state's special
interest in children permits it to protect them from almost any literature that
could possibly be harmful to them.' 5
The city argued in Interstate Circuit that its ordinance prohibiting children
from seeing films featuring "brutality," "depravity" and "criminal violence"
352 U.S. 380 (1957), struck a clause from the ordinance providing for revocation of the
exhibitor's license to show films classified as "not suitable" for children in the event
of violations of the ordinance or failure to exercise ordinary diligence to determine those
below the age of sixteen. This provision would deny exhibitors the right to show films
not obscene as to adults and thereby preclude adults from viewing films not obscene as to
them. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 249 F. Supp. 19, 25 (ND. Tex. 1965).
10For a discussion of the adult standard, see notes 33-45 infra and accompanying text.
11366 F.2d at 595. The only other case which has considered a children's film classifica-
tion statute is Paramount Film Distrib. Corp. v. City of Chicago, 172 F. Supp. 69 (N.D.
Ill. 1959), which held a Chicago children's classification statute unconstitutional. For a
discussion of this case, see note 32 infra.
On the constitutionality of film classification statutes, see Green, Obscenity, Censorship,
and Juvenile Delinquency, 14 U. TORONTO L.J. 229, 245, 250-51 (1962) ; Note, Entertainment:
Public Pressures and the Law, 71 HE v. L. REv. 326, 341-42 (1957); Note, "For Adults
Only": The Constitutionality of Government Film Censorship by Age Classification, 69
YALE L.J. 141 (1960).
12 See note 3 supra.
1s 366 F.2d at 597-98. Because the court so limited the classification standard, it was not
necessary to consider the allegations as to the vagueness of provisions purporting to classify
on a basis other than obscenity.
14For good examples of this kind of legislation, see CoNm. GENl. STAT. Rnv. § 53-244
(1958); MAss. Gm. LAws Am. ch. 272, § 30 (1958); TEx. PEn. CODE AN. art. 527b (Supp.
1966). Such statutes embrace materials objectionable for children but not obscene for
children.
15 In People v. Kahan, 15 N.Y.2d 311, 206 N.E.2d 333, 258 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1965), Judge
Fuld, concurring, said:
Underlying the First Amendment is the premise that government cannot be trusted
to regulate thought or opinion and that people may and, in fact, must be left to
reject for themselves false or harmful doctrine whether it involves political, moral
or other precepts. [Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 516-45 (1945) (concurring
opinion of Jackson, J.); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (con-
curring opinion of Brandeis, J.).] But the same reliance need not be and has
never . . . been placed on the judgment of children, and the Constitution does
not secure to them the same, almost absolute, right assured to adults to judge
and determine for themselves what they may read and what they should reject.
NOTES1967]
HeinOnline  -- 55 Cal. L. Rev. 927 1967
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
was valid against the claim that it violated the first amendment rights of
minors.' 6 However, the Supreme Court in Roth v. United States'7 held that
only obscene material is beyond the protection of the first amendment and has
rejected all attempts to employ nonobscenity standards in legislation proscribing
the sale of literature or the censorship of films.'
8
The city argued that restricting first amendment rights of minors may be
justified in this context by society's overriding interest in protecting its youth.
It relied on Prince v. Massachusetts,9 in which a state statute prohibiting minors
from selling periodicals or other articles of merchandise upon the streets was held
not to violate the first amendment right of a child to disseminate religious
literature. The Prince Court reasoned that the statute was not designed to limit
the child's freedom of religion but rather was intended to regulate child labor.
The Court then held that the statute was not unconstitutional merely because
in regulating child labor it incidentally affected the child's free exercise of reli-
gion.20 Therefore, Prince is not authority for the proposition in Interstate Circuit
that because "the state's authority over children's activities is broader than over
the like actions of adults,"'2' it may enact a statute directly aimed at curtailing
a child's first amendment rights.
22
The court found additional support for the city's position in Justice
Brennan's dictum in Jacobellis v. Ohio that obscenity legislation be drafted
narrowly to prevent the dissemination to children of material deemed "harm-
16 366 F.2d at 597.
17 354 U.S. 476 (1957). For a comprehensive discussion of Roth, see Lockhart & McClure,
Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MIxN. L. Rxv. 5
(1960). Obscenity law prior to Roth is treated in an earlier article by the same authors:
Lockhart & McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity, and the Constitution, 38 MWnr. L.
REv. 295 (1954). See also, Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, in 1960 Sup.
CT. REv. 1 (P. Kurland ed. 1960).
' 8 Holmby Prods., Inc. v. Vaughn, 350 U.S. 870 (1957) (per curiam) (obscene, inde-
cent, and immoral, and such as tends to debase or corrupt morals); Superior Films, Inc.
v. Department of Educ., 346 U.S. 587 (1954) (per curiam) (harmful); Commercial Pictures
Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 346 U.S. 587 (1954) (per curiam)
(immoral . .. [and may] tend to corrupt morals); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343
U.S. 495 (1952) (sacrilegious); Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952) (per curiam) (preju-
dicial to the best interests of the people); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
It is arguable that past cases rejecting broad standards are distinguishable on the ground
that they concerned statutes of general application rather than children's statutes. It may
be, therefore, that restrictions on more than obscenity would be constitutional if applied
only to children. Note, "For Adults Only": The Constitutionality of Governmental Film
Censorship by Age Classification, 69 YAr L.J. 141, 150-51 (1960).
19321 U.S. 158 (1944).
20 Justice Black has articulated the distinction between laws which directly abridge
first amendment freedoms and laws which primarily regulate conduct but which might
indirectly affect those freedoms. He would hold the former unconstitutional, but agrees
that the latter can be justified by a congressional or judicial balancing process. Barenblatt
v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 141-42 (1959) (dissenting opinion). See also Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
21321 U.S. at 168. By this statement the Prince Court meant simply that the state
may regulate children's activity to a greater extent than it may regulate adults' activity.
It may, for example, prohibit a child from engaging in manual labor while it may not
prohibit an adult from doing so. Id. at 166.
22 366 F.2d at 598.
[Vol. 55: 926
HeinOnline  -- 55 Cal. L. Rev. 928 1967
f1l" to them.23 The use of "harmful to children" rather than "obscene as to
children" may indicate that Justice Brennan envisioned the type of broad
legislation found in the Dallas ordinance. However, such a close reading of the
dictum seems tenuous.
There is nothing to indicate that children are relegated to second class
citizenship where first amendment rights are conceriied
4 In Katzev v. County
of Los Angeles25 the Supreme Court of California struck down a statute pro-
scribing the sale of crime comics to children and held that the state must show
that the gravity of the evil of such comic books, discounted by its improbability,
justified the invasion of the child's freedom of speech 2 6 Further, in Police
Commissioner v. Siegel Enterprises, Incorporated2 7 the Maryland Supreme
Court held that children have a constitutional right to read crime comics and
stated that the right of young persons to read what they choose is vital to the
whole community.
2 8
These cases support the conclusion reached by the court in Interstate Circuit
that broad, nonobscenity standards in a censorship statute are unconstitutional
even though the statute applies only to children. It justified its holding by
recalling the long history of censorship abuse and declared that "even the child's
freedom of speech [is] too precious to be subjected to the whim of the censor."
29
However, the court did not strike the entire statute down. Instead, it substituted
its own standard for children's obscenity for the Dallas standard ruled unconsti-
tutional.
Interstate Circuit is one of four cases3° decided in 1966 which held for the
first time that children's obscenity statutes31 are constitutional.3 2 These cases
23378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964) (emphasis added). For full text of Justice Brennan's state-
ment, see note 54 infra.
24 See Note, First Amendment Right of Association for High School Student, 55 CAr.
L. R v. 911 (1967).
25 52 Cal. 2d 360, 341 P.2d 310 (1959).
26 Id. at 366, 341 P.2d at 314. This test was first announced in Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494 (1951).
27223 Md. 110, 162 A.2d 727 (1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 909 (1960).
28 Id. at 120, 162 A.2d at 731.
20 366 F.2d at 599. See also Chief Justice Warren's account of the history of the censor-
ship power in Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 69-73 (1961) (dissenting
opinion).
80The others were: Chemline, Inc. v. City of Grand Prairie, 364 F.2d 721 (5th Cir.
1966) (upholding prohibition of motion pictures visible from any public street or highway
and which show bare buttocks or bare female breasts or whose main or primary material
is strip-tease, burlesque or nudist-type scenes); Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 18 N.Y.2d
71, 218 N.E.2d 668, 271 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1966) (upholding the state's power to enact a chil-
dren's obscenity statute); People v. Tannenbaum, 18 N.Y.2d 268, 220 N.E.2d 783, 274
N.Y.S.2d 131 (1966) (upholding New York's children's obscenity statute against claims of
unconstitutional vagueness and insufficient scienter requirements).
31The phrase "children's obscenity statute" denotes a statute providing a separate
obscenity standard for children. It does not include statutes which have prohibited the sale
of obscene material to children without varying the adult obscenity standard. For examples
of the latter, see CAL,. PEN. CODE §§ 311, 311.3 (West 1956) ; GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-6301.1
(Supp. 1966); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 436.100, 436.550, 436.560 (1963) (also bars certain
comic books).
3
2 Other cases which have dealt with children's obscenity statutes have found them
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raise the question whether it is possible to develop a children's obscenity
standard which is both effective and constitutional.8 8
In holding that obscenity is outside the area of constitutionally protected
speech, the Supreme Court in Roth dispensed with the necessity of dealing with
obscene speech as the Court has traditionally dealt with the suppression of other
forms of speech and press-by applying some form of the clear and present
danger test.34 During the Supreme Court's 1965 term, three decisions8 0  at-
tempted to expand and refine the Roth test for obscenity.30 In Fanny Hill v.
Attorney Generals7 the Court reaffirmed that for a finding of obscenity three
elements must coalesce: (1) the dominant theme of the material must have
unconstitutional on one ground or another. See Paramount Film Distrib. Corp. v. City of
Chicago, 172 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Ill. 1959), which struck down a Chicago film classification
statute on three alternative grounds: (1) the 21 year age limit was unreasonable, (2) a
picture cannot be simultaneously obscene as to children and not obscene as to adults, and
(3) the statutory standard was hopelessly indefinite; People v. Kahan, 15 N.Y.2d 311, 206
N.E.2d 333, 258 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1965) (per curiam) (vagueness); People v. Bookcase, Inc.,
14 N.Y.2d 409, 201 N.E.2d 14, 252 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1964) (vagueness; but properly drawn
children's statute would be constitutional).
33 Other problems with children's obscenity statutes-such as whether the statute must
require scienter of the age of the child and whether the statute imposes unconstitutional
prior restraints-are beyond the scope of this Note. In People v. Tannenbaum, 18 N.Y.2d 268,
220 N.E.2d 783, 274 N.Y.S.2d 13'1 (1966), the court held that a requirement of scienter of
the age of the child was not constitutionally mandatory. And the court held in Interstate
Circuit that the Dallas classification statute did not impose an unconstitutional prior re-
straint because it complied with the standards established in Freedman v. Maryland, 380
U.S. 51 (1965). 366 F.2d at 599-601.
34 It is beyond the scope of this Note to question the wisdom of the Roth approach.
However, there were alternative methods for dealing with the problem. The Court could
have determined whether defendant's publications tended to create a substantive evil which
society had a right to prevent, Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 667-70 (1925), or
whether they created a clear and present danger of such an evil, Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88, 105 (1940); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (concurring
opinion of Brandeis, J.); Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (Holmes, J.), or
whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justified such invasion of
free expression as was necessary to avoid the danger, Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,
510 (1951). For the argument that these more traditional methods of dealing with speech
should be applied to obscenity, see Comment, More Ado About Dirty Books, 75 YAr I.J.
1364 (1966).
35 A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney
General, 383 U.S. 413 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Fanny Hill v. Attorney General]; Mish-
kin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
36 The Roth Court's definition calls for consideration of "whether to the average person,
applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken
as a whole appeals to the prurient interest." 354 U.S. at 489. Later decisions have attempted
to clarify the test. In Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964), the relevant community
standards were determined to be "national standards," id. at 192-95, and the Court held
that in order to proscribe material it must be "utterly without redeeming social value."
Id. at 191. In Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962), the requirement that the
material be patently offensive was added. id. at 482. The Manual Enterprises Court insisted
that the element of patent offensiveness was inherent in the original Roth test.
37383 U.S. 413 (1966).
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prurient appeal,38 (2) the material must be patently offensive,3 9 affronting com-
munity standards concerning the representation of sex, and (3) the material must
be utterly without redeeming social value.40 In Ginzburg v. United States41 the
Court announced the new "pandering ' '42 test. If material is marketed specifically
for its prurient appeal, the courts may find the material obscene even though
it has a minimum of social value. Hence, in close cases, this test may render an
otherwise nonobscene work obscene.43 Finally, Mishkin v. New York 44 held that
the prurient appeal requirement can be conformed to "social realities" by per-
mitting the prurient appeal of material designed for sexual deviants to be
assessed in terms of the sexual interests of intended and probable recipients. 45
Children's obscenity is merely an aspect of general obscenity law. Recog-
nizing this, the court in Interstate Circuit adopted a children's standard by
modifying the Roth test:
48
A film that is obscene when viewed by an audience of young persons is one which,
to the average young person, applying contemporary community standards, the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest,
substantially goes beyond the customary limits of candor in descripion or representa-
tion of such matters to the average young person, and is utterly without redeeming
social importance.4 7
Under this children's obscenity standard, children may be isolated from material
admittedly not obscene under the Roth test.
Evidently one reason for the recent rash of children's obscenity statutes48 is
that the Supreme Court administers the Roth test to protect material that in the
eyes of state and local lawmakers is objectionable for children. 49 In fact, prac-
3 8 Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1959) defines prurient in pertinent
part, as follows: "Itching; longing; uneasy with desire or longing; of persons, having itch-
ing, morbid, or lascivious longings; of desire, curiosity, or propensity, lewd."
3 9 This requirement was first clearly announced in Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370
U.S. 478, 482 (1962).
40The relevance of social value was introduced in Roth, but the requirement that
questioned material must be "utterly" without redeeming social value was articulated for
the first time in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
41383 U.S. 463 (1966).
4 2 Pandering is defined in the opinion as "the business of purveying textual or graphic
matter openly advertised to appeal to the erotic interest of their customers." 383 U.S. at
467. This definition was adopted from Chief justice Warren's concurring opinion in Roth,
354 U.S. at 495.
43 383 U.S. at 475-76. The opinion stated that "the circumstances of presentation and
dissemination of material are equally relevant to determining whether social importance
claimed for material . . . was, in the circumstances, pretense or reality-whether it was
the basis upon which it was traded in the marketplace or a spurious claim for litigation
purposes." Id. at 470.
44383 U.S. 502 (1966). 0
45 Id. at 508. For an excellent account of the confused state of obscenity law after
Mishkin, Ginzburg, and Fanny Hill, see Comment, More Ado About Dirty Books, 75 YALE
LJ. 1364 (1966).
4 o For the Roth test see note 36 supra.
47 366 F.2d at 593 (emphasis added).
48See notes 1, 14 supra; notes 60, 71 infra.
49 See United States v. Klaw, 350 F.2d 155, 158-59 (2d Cir. 1965) ; People v. Bookcase,
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tically the only material that can be banned at present is bard core pornog-
raphy.
50
Since the Supreme Court has never considered the constitutionality of sepa-
rate standards for children, it is not clear that such standards would be held
constitutional. 51 In any case, separate children's standards may not operate to
restrict the reading and viewing fare of adults.5 2 Hence, children's statutes must
be drafted to guarantee adults unimpaired access to constitutionally protected
material.
53
Several justices of the Supreme Court have indicated in dicta that separate
children's standards would be constitutional-even desirable.5 4 However, the
Inc., 14 N.Y.2d 409, 419, 201 NYE.2d 14, 19, 252 N.Y.S.2d 433, 441 (1964) (dissenting
opinion of Burke, J.); Larkin v. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 14 N.Y.2d 399, 406, 200 N.E.2d 760,
764, 252 N.Y.S.2d 71, 77 (1964) (dissenting opinion of Desmond, J.). But cf., Note, Enter-
tainment: Public Pressures and the Law, 71 HARV. L. REV. 326 (1957); Note, Extralegal
Censorship of Literature, 33 N.Y.U.L. RFv. 989 (1958).
50 United States v. KJaw, 350 F.2d 155, 168 (2d Cir. 1965). See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378
U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (concurring opinion of Stewart, J.); People v. Richmond County
News, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 578, 175 N.E.2d 681, 216 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1961).
51 Cf. In re Gault, 87 S. Ct. 1428 (1967) which held that a fifteen year old boy was
denied due process of law because juvenile delinquency proceedings which may lead to
commitment in a state institution must measure up to the constitutional essentials of due
process and fair treatment. "Neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is
for adults alone." Id. at 1436.
52 Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963); Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S.
380 (1957); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 249 F. Supp. 19 (N.D. Tex. 1965);
Katsev v. City of Los Angeles, 52 Cal. 2d 360, 341 P.2d 310 (1959); Police Comm'r v.
Siegel Enterprises, Inc., 223 Md. 110, 162 A.2d 727 (1959), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 909
(1960) ; State v. Miller, 145 W.Va. 59, 112 S.E.2d 472 (1960) ; Goldstein v. Commonwealth,
200 Va. 25, 104 S.E.2d 66 (1958).
53For suggestions concerning how such a statute could prohibit the sale of proscribed
material to children without impairing its availability for adults, see Dibble, Obscenity:
A State Quarantine to Protect Children, 39 S. CAL. L. Rv. 345, 370-72 (1966).
54We recognize the legitimate and indeed exigent interest of States and localities
throughout the Nation in preventing the dissemination of material deemed harmful
to children. But that interest does not justify a total suppression of such material,
the effect of which would be to "reduce the adult population . . .to reading only
what is fit for children." Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383. State and local
authorities might well consider whether their objectives in this area would be better
served by laws aimed specifically at preventing distribution of objectionable material
to children, rather than at totally prohibiting its dissemination.
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964) (per Brennan, 3.) (emphasis added). Chief
Justice Warren in a dissenting opinion said that a work may be "inoffensive under most
circumstances but, at the same time, 'obscene' in the extreme when sold or displayed to
children." Id. at 201. Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion made it clear that he favors
allowing the state a wide scope in the field of regulating the distribution of obscene
materials to children. Id. at 203-04. Since Justice Goldberg joined in Justice Brennan's
opinion and Justice Clark joined in Chief Justice Warren's opinion, five justices seem to
approve the idea of separate standards for children. See also Ginzburg v. United States,
383 U.S. 463, 475; Id. at 498 n.1 (dissenting opinion of Stewart, J.); Fanny Hill v.
Attorney General, 383 U.S. at 421 n.8; Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. at 76
(concurring opinion of Clark, J.).
For pertinent statements in the lower courts, see United States v. Klaw, 350 F.2d 155,
164 n.10 (2d Cir. 1965); In re Louisiana News Co. v. Dayries, 187 F. Supp. 241, 247 (E.D.
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force of these statements should not be overestimated; in Jacobellis v. Ohio, for
example, the Court struck down a statute which attempted to protect children
by applying broad children's standards to the whole community. 55
Further support for the modified Roth standard proposed in Interstate Cir-
cuit is the concept of variable obscenity found in Mishkin.56 Interstate Circuit
interpreted Mishkin as repudiating the concept of constant obscenity which
assumes that "obscenity is an inherent quality of material that renders it unfit
for everyone in all circumstances. '57 Technically, Mishkin held only that the
prurient appeal of material designed to appeal to deviant sexual interests could
be assessed in terms of its prurient appeal to sexual deviants. This may indicate
that unless material is designed to appeal to the prurient interest of children it
may not be proscribed for children. But the concept of variable obscenity as
implicitly approved by the Supreme Court may be more expansive, allowing
material which in practical effect appeals to the prurient interest of children to
be proscribed as to them.58 In any event, it is one thing to accept the theory of
variable obscenity for children; it is another to harness it in a workable children's
obscenity statute.
Children's obscenity legislation is premised upon widespread assumptions
that children are more naive and more susceptible to the corrupting influences of
pornography and more easily incited to antisocial conduct than adults;59 the
preambles to most children's obscenity statutes justify the tighter standards on
the theory that dirty films, books and pictures tend to promote juvenile crime
and delinquency.60 It is also assumed that the prurient interest of children may
be stimulated by material which would fail to arouse adults.
La. 1960); Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 18 N.Y.2d 71, 218 N.E.2d 668, 271 N.Y.S.2d 947
(1966); People v. Tannenbaum, 18 N.Y.2d 268, 220 N.E.2d 783, 274 N.Y.S.2d 131 (1966);
People v. Kahan, 15 N.Y.2d 311, 206 N.E.2d 333, 258 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1965) (per curiam);
People v. Bookcase, Inc., 14 N.Y.2d 409, 201 N.E.2d 14, 252 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1964); State
v. Settle, 90 R.I. 195, 156 A.2d 921 (1959).
55 378 U.S. 184 (1964). The statute provided that "No person shall knowingly sell ...
[any] book . . . not wholly obscene but containing lewd or lascivious articles, advertise-
ments, photographs, or drawing, representation, figure, image, cast, instrument, or article
of an indecent or immoral nature." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 186 n.1 (1964).
5GThe differences between the concepts of "variable" and "constant" obscenity are
discussed in Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional
Standards, 45 M=nr. L. R.v. 5, 68, 72-73, 77-78 (1960).
57 366 F.2d at 595, quoting Lockhart & McClure, supra note 56, at 85. Lower federal
courts had previously approved the concept of variable obscenity on at least two occasions.
See Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 289 F.2d 455 (1961), rev'd on other grounds, 370
U.S. 478 (1962); United States v. 31 Photographs, 156 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
But see Paramount Film Distrib. Corp. v. City of Chicago, 172 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Ill. 1959).
58 See, e.g., Gerber, A Suggested Solution to the Riddle of Obscenity, 112 U. PA. L.
REV. 834, 847-52 (1964); Green, Obscenity, Censorship, and Juvenile Delinquency, 14 U.
TORONTO L.J. 229, 250-51 (1962); Lockhart & McClure, supra note 56, at 77-88; Note,
"For Adults Only": The Constitutionality of Governmental Film Censorship by Age Classi-
fication, 69 YALE LJ. 141 (1960).
59 See J. PAuL & M. ScHwARTZ, FEDERA CENsoRsmn': OBSCENy nT THE MAIL 191-202
(1961). It is evident that a significant portion of the citizens support obscenity legislation.
See, e.g., the genesis of the ordinance in Chemline, Inc. v. City of Grand Prairie, 364 F.2d
721, 722-23 (5th Cir. 1966).
6OThe preambles to most state and local children's obscenity statutes contain some
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In fact, expert opinion is divided on whether obscene expression is more
harmful to children than to adults and whether it tends to incite juvenile delin-
quency.61 Most experts agree that there is no scientific evidence that this is
true.6 2 But legislatures regularly adopt children's obscenity statutes notwith-
standing the lack of trustworthy evidence that children need special protection."3
An initial hurdle that the modified Roth standard faces is the problem of
unconstitutional vagueness. The Supreme Court has recognized that the Roth
test is itself inherently vague.6 4 The Court in Roth considered this problem of
vagueness and concluded that, although the terms of obscenity statutes are far
statement that obscene films and literature cause juvenile delinquency. See N.J. Rxv. STAT.
§ 2A: 115-3.3 (Supp. 1966); N.Y. PEN. STAT. § 484-e (Supp. 1966). See also Police Comm'r
v. Siegel Enterprises, Inc., 223 Md. 110, 162 A.2d 727 (1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 909
(1960) ; State v. Settle, 90 R.I. 195, 198, 156 A.2d 921, 924 (1959) (purpose of the statute
clearly to protect "youth and to combat juvenile delinquency").
6 1 Compare Cairns, Paul, & Wishner, Sex Censorship: The Assumptions of Anti-
Obscenity Laws and the Empirical Evidence, 46 Mmnr. L. REv. 1009 (1962); Green,
Obscenity, Censorship, and Juvenile Delinquency, 14 U. TORONTO L.J. 229 (1962); and
Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 CoLum. L. REV. 391 (1963)
with Kefauver, Obscene and Pornographic Literature and JuvenileODelinquency, 24 FED.
PROBATION, Dec. 1960, at 3; and S. REP. No. 2381, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956). See also B.
KARPMAN, THE SEXUAL Oi-TENDER AND His OmNsEs: ETIOLOGY, PATHOLOGY, PSYCHo-
DYNAmflCS, AND TREATrENT (1954); N. ST. JOHN-STEvAS, OBSCENnTY AND THE LAW (1956);
Berninghausen & Faunce, An Exploratory Study of Juvenile Delinquency and the Reading
of Sensational Books, 33 J. or EXPEpImENTAL Enuc. 161 (1964); Dickens & Williams,
Mass Communication: Aggression and Violence in the Mass Media, 34 Rv. or EDUC.
RESEARcH 216 (1964); Murphy, The Value of Pornography, 10 WAYNE L. REv. 655 (1964).
See United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 812-17 (2d Cir. 1956) (dissenting opinion of
Frank, J.), aff'd, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Katsev v. County of Los Angeles, 336 P.2d 6,
10-14 (Cal. App.), vacated, 52 Cal. 2d 360, 341 P.2d 310 (1959).
62 See, e.g., Green, Obscenity, Censorship, and Juvenile Delinquency, 14 TORONTO L.J.
229 (1962).
63 See California Attorney General, A Report to the California Legislature, Obscenity:
The Law and the Nature of the Business, April 6, 1967. The report cites with approval a
comment by one Pennsylvania judge:
It is the habit of the purveyors of obscenity continuously to demand "scien-
tific evidence" proving that it is harmful to children or to some important fraction
of adults. My reply has been that the harm from this filth is obvious and my
argument is based on the most commonly accepted principle of learning....
Man tends to become that which he admires, and he is led to admire that
which is frequently presented to him. To reach the conclusions sought by the
pornographers, we have to discard every known principle of education.
Id. at 106-07.
6 4 Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. at 476-82 (dissenting opinion of Black, 3.);
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. at 191 (Brennan, J.) ; id. at 197 (concurring opinion of Stewart,
J.); id. at 199-203 (dissenting opinion of Warren, C.J.); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963) (protected material is separated from obscene material by a "dim
and uncertain line"); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963) (strict standards of
vagueness are required in the first amendment area); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S.
507, 522-23 (1948) (dissenting opinion of Frankfurter, J.); Paramount Film Distrib. Corp.
v. City of Chicago, 172 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Ill. 1959) (that the statute is designed for
children does not excuse a certain amount of vagueness). See generally Note, The Void-for-
Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
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from precise, the "Constitution does not require impossible standards." 65 The
question in each case is whether the language of the statute "conveys sufficiently
definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common under-
standing and practices." 66 Interstate Circuit's modified Roth standard for chil-
dren, by building on an already vague standard, has compounded that
vagueness.67 Since obscene material under the Roth test must be both patently
offensive and utterly without redeeming social value, it has become equated with
hard core pornography. Because the dividing line between hard core pornography
and all other expression is comparatively easy to recognize,68 the Roth standard
may have become clearer over time. But the modified Roth standard used in
Interstate Circuit requires the retailer to distinguish between material which
may lawfully be sold only to adults and material lawful for children. The
retailer must determine at his peril what appeals to the prurient interest of the
average child, and what is patently offensive for the average child, and what
has social value for the average child. Since this may be an impossible task
considering the adult's frame of reference, the modified Rotk standard may well
be unconstitutionally vague. However, the efficacy of the modified Roth
standard is doubtful on grounds other than vagueness.
Applying a variable obscenity standard to children may accomplish very
little in the way of proscribing material thought harmful for children. While it is
true that the prurient interest test could be modified for children, the prurient
interest of the average child is stimulated by the same kind of material that
appeals to the prurient interest of the average adult. The question is whether
children are titillated by less graphic sexual expression than adults.6 9 In the
case of pictures and films one may acquire an immunity to sexual expression
so that with experience more and more potent material is needed to titillate. On
the other hand, it is more likely that adults are stimulated by less erotic material
than would stimulate children because, being more experienced and sophisticated
than children, they can more easily read sex into the material. Hence, it may well
be that all material which has prurient appeal to children will also have prurient
appeal for adults, and that some material which has prurient appeal for adults
will not have prurient appeal for children. Application of the variable obscenity
concept to the requirement of prurient appeal may not, therefore, significantly
differentiate material available under the statute for adults only from that
available for children.
Apart from the problems of modifying the "prurient interest" requirement for
children, it is not clear whether or how the Supreme Court would vary require-
ments of "patent offensiveness" and "social importance" for children. The
modified Roth test announced in Interstate Circuit purports to modify the patent
offensiveness requirement." However, the question here is not whether the
65 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491 (1957).
a0id.
67 See generally People v. Kahan, 15 N.Y.2d 311, 314, 206 N.E.2d 333, 335, 258 N.Y.S.2d
391, 393-94 (1965) (concurring opinion of Fuld, J.); Note, The Youth-Obscenity
Problen---a Proposal, 52 Ky. Lj. 429, 441 (1964).
08 Compare Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 499 (dissenting opinion of
Stewart, J.), with Id. at 476-82 (dissenting opinion of Black, J.).
9See Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 18 N.Y.2d 71, 77, 218 N.E.2d at 672-73, 271
N.Y.S.2d 947, 953 (1966).
70 366 F.2d at 593. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
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material is patently offensive to the average child but whether the community
considers it "beyond the customary limits of candor" to expose the child to the
material. The New York statute makes this more explicit by providing that the
patent offensiveness requirement is met if the average parent considers the
material patently offensive for his child.71
If the Supreme Court modifies the prurient appeal requirement for children,
it may also vary the patent offensiveness requirement. For these elements of
the Roth test both concern the mental impact of the material on the viewer.
Whether the Supreme Court would vary the social importance requirement
is, however, another matter. The most effective bar to developing an effective
and constitutional children's obscenity statute is the requirement that material
must be utterly without social value. It is significant that the modified Roth test
as articulated in Interstate Circuit does not modify the social importance test for
children. However, without modifying the social importance test it is almost
impossible to achieve more stringent censorship for children. In the Supreme
Court's administration of the Roth test, the social importance requirement has
salvaged most of the material challenged even though the material appealed to
prurient interest and was patently offensive.72 Experts can testify that almost
any material has a "modicum" of social importance. Perhaps Interstate Circuit
failed to adjust the social importance requirement because Fanny Hill was
emphatic in holding that obscene material must be utterly without social value.78
However, the "pandering" test announced in Ginzburg may indicate that
the requirement that the material be utterly without social value is not im-
mutable.74 If the Court is willing to accept this invasion of the social importance
doctrine, it may also adjust the social importance requirement for children.
The social importance requirement could be modified for children by
requiring that, in order to be proscribed, material must be utterly without social
value for the average child. However, experience with the Roth test indicates
that the hopes of promoters of children's obscenity statutes will be frustrated if,
in order to be proscribed, material must be without social importance for chil-
dren. The social importance of a work depends on whether it has artistic merit,
whether it is well written and has a coherent theme, or whether it expounds
constructive ideas or has historical interest.7 5 Under a modified social importance
requirement the question in each case is whether the average child can appre-
ciate those qualities of a work that give it social importance for adults.
It may be that the average child-especially those children fourteen to
seventeen-is intellectually mature enough to appreciate a given book or film
almost as fully as the average adult. If this is the case, then the children's
obscenity statute will be ineffective even if it contains a modified social im-
71See N.Y. PEN. LAW § 484-h(1)(f) (1965).
72See, e.g., Fanny Hill v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413, 419-20 (1966); McCauley
v. Tropic of Cancer, 20 Wis. 2d 134, 121 N.W.2d 545 (1963).
73 383 U.S. at 418-20 (1966).
74 Ginzburg held that if material is "pandered" or sold solely on the basis of its erotic
interest to customers, the material could be obscene even though it had a minimum of social
value. In short, defendants in the "sordid business" of purveying erotically appealing material
may not make a "spurious" claim for purposes of litigation alone that their material has
social value. 383 U.S. at 470 (1966).
75 See, e.g., Fanny Hill v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413, 419-20 (1966); McCauley
v. Tropic of Cancer, 20 Wis. 2d 134, 121 N.W.2d 545 (1963).
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portance criterion. Realizing this, California legislators have introduced a chil-
dren's obscenity bill in which the social value of material is balanced against its
prurient appeal7 6 If the prurient appeal outweighs the social importance, the
work can be censored for children under the proposed law.
The proposed California bill runs directly counter to language in Fanny Hill
that the constitutional status of material can not turn on "weighing" its social
importance against its prurient appeal.77 Fanny Hill seems to eliminate the
possibility of emasculating the social importance requirement in a children's
obscenity statute. For this reason, it may be difficult or impossible to salvage an
effective and constitutional children's obscenity statute using a modified Roth
standard.
Interstate Circuit was decided correctly. The broad, nonobscenity standard
of the film classification statute was almost certainly unconstitutional.
However, the modified Roth standard that the court substituted in its place will
probably not satisfy supporters of children's obscenity statutes. While there are
indications that a standard of obscenity which alters all three elements of the
Roth test may be held constitutional by the Supreme Court, there is grave doubt
whether it will keep much "objectionable" material out of the hands of children.
Of course, the state may always show that such objectionable material presents a
clear and present danger of a harm which the state has a right to prevent. Legis-
lators might consider that if it cannot be demonstrated that obscene material
presents a clear and present danger to children, no harm exists.
John F. Pritchard
ESTATE TAX: Remainder Interest Bequeathed to Charity Subject to a Power
of Invasion Exercisable in Favor of the Life Tenant May Qualify for
Charitable Deduction-Estate of Schildkraut v. Commissioner (2d Cir.
1966).
In Estate of Schildkraut v. Commissioner' the Second Circuit allowed a
charitable deduction for a remainder interest bequeathed to charity,2 where the
corpus of the trust was subject to a power of invasion in favor of the testator's
widow, guaranteeing her a fixed amount of trust income each year. The Com-
missioner argued that the invasion for the private interest could eventually
reduce the charity's interest to zero, and the executors, acknowledging the
probable exercise of the power each year of the widow's life, did not contend that
7 S.B. 79, § 313(a), Cal. 1967 Sess. For examples of the kind of material California
hopes to proscribe for children in its new children's obscenity statute, see California At-
torney General supra, note 63.
77 383 U.S. at 419; Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964) (Brennan, J.). See also
Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, 59 Cal. 2d 901, 920, 383 P.2d 152, 164-65, 31 Cal. Rptr. 800, 812-13
(1963).
1368 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 959 (1967), rev'g in part 24 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 1215 (1965).
2 Section 2055 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 allows a deduction from the value
of the gross estate of all bequests, legacies, devises, or transfers for public, charitable and
religious uses.
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the likelihood of diverting principal from the charitable to the private interest
was "so remote as to be negligible."'3 The court, however, held that the charitable
interest could be adequately calculated with actuarial tables and therefore
qualified for a deduction under section 2055 of the Internal Revenue Code.
4
Sol Schildkraut, the testator, left an estate valued at slightly under one
million dollars. His will created a trust with a principal amount of 300,000
dollars and directed his executors to pay to his widow 1,000 dollars a month out
of income of the trust and, if the income was insufficient, out of principal. Upon
the death of Mrs. Schildkraut, the remaining principal of the trust vested in the
Schildkraut Foundation, a New York charitable corporation.
The Tax Court, finding that the bequest failed to satisfy standards for
deductibility under section 2055, denied the estate a charitable deduction for
the present value of the amount actuarially calculated to reach the charity.0 The
court interpreted Treasury Regulations as requiring that an ascertainable part
3Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(b) (1958). For text see note 6 infra.
4 368 F.2d at 49.
5 Id. at 41. An additional trust provision directed the executors to pay out of the trust
corpus federal and state income taxes on any sum paid to the widow from the trust and
the real estate taxes on certain property in Florida as long as Mrs. Schildkraut continued
to own it. The court of appeals recognized the possibility of increases in tax rates during
Mrs. Schildkraut's life but rejected it as a basis for denying the charitable deduction. The
court held that it was judicially sound to focus only on the facts and tax rates prevailing
as of the date of decedent's death. Id. at 49.
The tax-exempt status of the Schildkraut Foundation was not at issue in the instant
proceedings; both the Tax Court and the court of appeals decisions conceded that the
Foundation has the necessary attributes of a tax-exempt recipient.
6Estate of Schildkraut, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1215 (1965). The pertinent parts of
the governing regulations read as follows:
§ 20.2055-2 Transfers not exclusively for charitable purposes
(a) Remainders and similar interests. If a trust is created or property is
transferred for both a charitable and a private purpose, deduction may be taken of
the value of the charitable beneficial interest only insofar as that interest is presently
ascertainable, and hence severable from the noncharitable interest. The present
value of a remainder or other deferred payment to be made for a charitable purpose
is to be determined in accordance with the rules stated in § 20.2031-7.
(b) Transfers subject to a condition or a power. If, as of the date of a
decedent's death, a transfer for charitable purpose is dependent upon the performance
of some act or the happening of a precedent event in order that it might become
effective, no deduction is allowed unless the possibility that the charitable transfer
will not become effective is so remote as to be negligible. If an estate or interest
has passed to or is vested in charity at the time of a decedent's death and the estate
or interest would be defeated by the performance of some act or the happening of
some event, the occurrence of which appeared to have been highly improbable at
the time of the decedent's death, the deduction is allowable. If the legatee, devisee,
donee, or trustee is empowered to divert the property or fund in whole or in part,
to a use or purpose which would have rendered it, to the extent that it is subject
to such power, not deductible had it been directly so bequeathed, devised, or given
by the decedent, the deduction will be limited to that portion, if any, of the prop-
erty or fund which is exempt from an exercise of the power.
Hereinafter, throughout the text of this Note, these subsections of Treas. Reg. section
20.2055-2 will be referred to as "subsection (a)" and "subsection (b)."
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of the charitable bequest be subject to only a negligible possibility of invasion in
favor of the private interest.
7
The Second Circuit reversed the Tax Court's denial of a charitable deduc-
tion, declaring that the proper test required a "presently ascertainable" interest
and an "assurance" that the Foundation would receive it. The court thus rejected
the Commissioner's argument that the deduction be denied unless the chance that
the charitable foundation would not take the remainder was "negligible." The
Commissioner had contended that the charity's interest was "conditional" within
the meaning of Treasury Regulation section 20.2055-2(b) because it was con-
tingent upon the life tenant's not exhausting the corpus by outliving her life
expectancy. Instead, the Second Circuit found that this particular type of inva-
sionary power-limited to a fixed amount and in no way subject to the volition
of the life tenant-did not create a conditional bequest. The court stressed the
measurable characteristics of the Schildkraut power of invasion and compared
the Foundation's interest to the normal deferred assured bequest to charity: a
remainder interest subject only to an outstanding life estate. The court allowed
the deduction on the authority of Treasury Regulation section 20.2055-2(a),
finding the Foundation's interest both "presently ascertainable" through cal-
culations with approved actuarial tables, and an "assured bequest," there being
"no uncertainty appreciably greater than the general uncertainty that attends
human affairs" that the charity would not receive the bequest.9
7" See Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2 (b) (1958), supra note 6. Petitioners did not strongly con-
tend that the probability of the widow living past her actuarial table estimate was negligible.
Petitioners' argument emphasized the combination of their claimed deductions. The
executors sought a marital deduction for the life estate of the widow and a charitable
deduction for the remainder interest to the Foundation. Because the entire amount of the
trust was to go either to the widow or the charity, and because both could be described
as "exempt" beneficiaries, the existence of one, it was argued, should not prejudice the
deduction for the other. The Tax Court commented that this argument was appealing from
a generally equitable standpoint, but that neither deduction, standing on its own, was justi-
fied by the Code. The widow's interest was terminable, and she did not have, with respect
to any portion of the trust corpus, a power of appointment by will or during life exercisable
by her alone and in all events; hence it failed to meet the requirements of § 2056(b) (5)
of the Code and violated the "specific portion" rule of Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-S (1958).
The charitable deduction, likewise, was separately evaluated and denied. 24 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. at 1219-21 (1965).
8 368 F.2d at 48. The court concluded that the bequest was governed by Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2055-2(a) (1958), not by Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(b) (1958), and was therefore entitled
to a deduction.
Though the court of appeals affirmed the Tax Court's denial of the marital deduction,
it specifically mentioned as a "crucial fact" that the entire corpus must go to the widow
or to the charity, both of whom would be tax-free recipients if the corpus were bequeathed
to them directly. 368 F.2d at 48.
9 368 F.2d at 48. This last quoted phrase was a conclusion and not a test announced
in Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929), see text accompanying notes
16-18 infra. There the Supreme Court concluded that a charity's interest met the negligi-
bility test [now promulgated in Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(b) (1958)] and then spoke of
"no uncertainty appreciably greater than the general uncertainty that attends human affairs."
In Schildkraut, however, it was obvious that the charity's interest could not meet the negli-
gibility test, but the court saw fit to use Ithaca's conclusion anyway.
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The Congressional policy of freeing gifts to charity from the estate tax has,
from its inception, been intended to encourage charitable contributions. 10 Even
though there is no express statutory authority for bequests of future interests to
charity, such bequests have never been disqualified merely because the charity's
right to present enjoyment has been postponed. However, the regulations have
sought to distinguish those bequests of future interests to charity which will
assuredly come into possession from those whose eventual possession by the
charitable beneficiary is uncertain. This distinction is a necessary one in view of
the nature of the estate tax: The tax must be computed on the basis of facts and
circumstances existing at the date of death; deductibility cannot await the time
when the charitable bequest finally vests in possession." Hence, if assured
bequests were not treated differently than contingent bequests, there would be
an obvious tax avoidance possibility for a "bequest" to charity conditioned on
an unrealistic event or on the volition of the taker-in-default. The wide range
of bequests between those in which the charity's interest is assured and those in
which the charity's interest will undoubtedly be divested is reflected by regula-
tions establishing standards of deductibility. Subsections (a) and (b) of Trea-
sury Regulation section 20.2055-212 attempt to set out a basic description of
assured and contingent bequests and to incorporate both the general legislative
policy of encouraging charitable contributions and the specific limitations of
deductibility that have been announced by the Supreme Court.
In 1928 the Supreme Court decided for the first time whether to allow a
deduction for bequests not certain to reach a charity. In Humes v. United
States,13 the Court denied a deduction for a bequest of twelve million dollars to
charity because it would be defeated if the life tenant, then aged fifteen years,
should live to be forty years old or should die leaving issue. The petitioner in
that case made two unsuccessful arguments: First, the present value of the
charity's interest was legally determinable, since the probabilities involved could
be shown by standard mortality and probability tables; 14 second, the
charity received a vested interest in a defeasible estate which was a present
property right having present value. The Court held that the fundamental
question was not whether the charity's interest could be valued but whether
Congress intended a deduction for contingent gifts of future interests to charity.
Acknowledging that Congress' intent was to encourage charitable contributions,
the Court nevertheless concluded that no deduction could be allowed for a
charitable bequest dependent upon a condition unfulfilled at the date of the
testator's death. 15
In the following year, the Supreme Court faced the question whether a power
of invasion in favor of the life tenant rendered a gift of a future interest to
charity so uncertain as to preclude a deduction. In Ithaca Trust Company v.
oFor the history of the charitable deduction in the federal estate tax and the treasury
regulations pertaining thereto see Taggart, Charitable Deductions for Transfers of Remainder
Interests Subject to Invasion, 21 TAx L. Rxv. 535, 540 n.8, 543 n.12 (1966).
ilIthaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151, 155 (1929).
12 See note 6 supra.
13 276 U.S. 487 (1928), aff'g sub norn. Mitchell v. United States, 63 Ct. Cl. 613 (1927).
14 Id. at 488. The Court was skeptical of the then recently developed experience tables
measuring the probability that a woman dying at a given age will die unmarried and the
probability that a woman who marries will die childless.
15 Id. at 494.
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United States,16 the will empowered the trustees to use from the principal any
sum "that may be necessary to suitably maintain [my widow] in as much
comfort as she now enjoys." This was a power of invasion limited by a standard
that was "fixed in fact and capable of being stated in definite terms of money"
and not subject to the trustee's or the widow's discretion. Since the projected
income of the estate was sufficient to maintain the widow as required, the Court
concluded that there was no reasonable possibility that the principal would be
invaded and not pass to the charity intact.17 A charitable deduction was allowed
for the present value of the entire amount of the trust corpus.
In reaching its conclusion the Court implicitly established two tests which
must be satisfied before a charitable bequest can qualify for a deduction. First,
a power of invasion or a condition that would deprive the charity of enjoyment
must be subject to a standard that is objective and capable of measurement
rather than subjective and governed by volition. Second, the possibility that the
charitable transfer will not become effective must be so slight that it may be
ignored, a version of the de minimus principle. These two requirements are
interrelated: The standard for the power of invasion or divesting condition must
be definite and measurable. Without such restraints one could never conclude with
certainty that the likelihood of depriving the charity of its interest is negligible.
Hence, while the objective-standard test is not specifically mentioned in the
regulations, it is implicitly a part of the de minimus principle or negligibility
test incorporated in subsection (b) of Treasury Regulation section 20.2055-2.'
s
In a 1943 case, Merchants National Bank v. Commissioner,9 the trustee was
authorized, in his discretion, to invade corpus for the "comfort, support, mainte-
nance, and/or happiness" of the widow and was directed to exercise that dis-
cretion with liberality toward the widow, preferring her welfare, comfort and
happiness to the claims of residuary charitable beneficiaries. The taxpayer had
prevailed before the Board of Tax Appeals on the premise that no corpus would
in fact be diverted for the widow's benefit, since she had substantial independent
means and no dependent children. The Supreme Court, however, disallowed the
charitable deduction entirely. It held that the power of invasion permitting a
diversion of corpus from the charitable recipient could not be estimated or
accounted for in the absence of an adequate standard for a court to restrict the
exercise of the trustee's discretion.20 It reasoned that Congress required a more
reliable measure than "happiness" and that the instruction to the trustee to exer-
cise his discretion with liberality could not be discounted without resort to specu-
lation. The Merchants National Bank case reiterated that the objective test had
to be met before applying the de minimus principle of Ithaca.
In the course of the Merchant's opinion, however, the Court read a particular
regulation quite broadly in an effort to clarify the requirements of the statute and
approve the regulations thereunder. That regulation, which remains substantially
unchanged as subsection (a), then read: "... a deduction may be taken of the
16279 U.S. 151 (1929).
17 Id. at 154.
18 The negligibility test of Ithaca was first incorporated into the Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.46
(1942), promulgated under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, in response to court deci-
sions which had permitted deductions of bequests assured in fact but conditional in form.
E.g., United States v. Provident Trust Co., 291 U.S. 272 (1934), discussed at note 36 infra.
19 320 U.S. 256 (1943).
2 0Id. at 260.
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value of the beneficial interest in favor of the [charity] only insofar as such
interest is presently ascertainable, and hence severable from the interest in favor
of the private use." 21 The Merchants National Bank Court appears to have mis-
construed this regulation to require that the charitable bequest have a "presently
ascertainable value." 22 Thus, the distinction in the regulation between the cer-
tainty of a charitable interest and the value of that interest dissolved. To add to
the confusion, the word "ascertainable" was used throughout the Merchants
opinion as a synonym for the words "definite" and "certain," thus weakening the
standard for a qualifying power of invasion.2 3 The result of this broad reading
and usage of the words "presently ascertainable" has been to conceal the techni-
cal and restrictive meaning of the phrase as it now stands in subsection (a).
In 1955 the Supreme Court had its most recent occasion to review charitable
deductions of future interests. In Commissioner v. Estate of Sternberger,24 a
charitable bequest was to take effect only if decedent's childless twenty-seven
year old daughter died without descendants surviving her and her mother. While
both the Tax Court and the court of appeals approved the taxpayer's actuarial
computations as fairly reflecting the present value of the future interest reduced
in proportion to the charity's chance to receive the corpus, 25 the Supreme Court
denied the charitable deduction. The Court pointed out the inappropriateness of
mortality and experience tables which fail to take account of the inducement to
the testator's daughter to marry and leave descendants. More importantly, it
found no statutory authority for deducting any percentage of a conditional be-
quest to charity where there is no assurance that the charity will receive the
bequest or some determinable part of it.26 The Court narrowly interpreted the
statutory purpose to allow a deduction only for property that will eventually be
used for charitable purposes.27 The Court explicitly approved the predecessors of
subsections (a) and (b) of Treasury Regulation section 20.2055-2 and found
that they fully implemented the predecessor of section 2055 of the 1954 Internal
Revenue Code. It stated that the two pertinent Treasury Regulations were
easily reconcilable and rejected the taxpayer's argument that they overlapped.2 8
21 Treas. Reg. 80, § 303, Art. 44 (1934) (emphasis added); cf. Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2
(a) (1958).
22 320 U.S. at 259.
23 d. at 261.
24348 U.S. 187 (1955).
25 Without doubt the accuracy and acceptability of mortality and remarriage tables
had improved since Humes v. United States, in which such tables were dismissed as "rela-
tively little known and unused in American legal proceedings." 276 U.S. at 492 (1928).
26348 U.S. at 198.
27 The dissent in Sternberger argued for a percentage deduction for conditional bequests
because it would further the Congressional policy of encouraging charitable contributions,
and because, in the aggregate, the deductions would substantially equal the amounts received
by charitable beneficiaries. Id. at 202.
One commentator, following this argument of the dissent, points out the unreality of
the remoteness test in the area of conditional gifts. Albert, Merchants National Bank v.
Commissioner and its Uncharitable Aftermath, 67 Dicx. L. REv. 145 (1963). Another writer
concedes the dissenters' argument but doubts whether the present rule has discouraged
transfers to charity. Taggart, supra note 10.
28 348 U.S. at 194. Regulations 81.44 and 81.46 preceded Treasury Regulation §§ 20.2055-2
(a) and 20.2055-2(b) respectively. Section 812(d) of the 1939 Code preceded § 2055 of the
1954 Internal Revenue Code.
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While the argument of overlap between the deferred bequest subsections of
the regulation was not specifically pressed upon the court of appeals by the
petitioners in Schildkraut, and, indeed, no court has discussed it in detail, it is a
viable explanation for the result of the case. The overlap argument proceeds
from the premise that subsection (a) sets forth the general rule of deductibility
while subsection (b) sets out some specific exceptions to the rule. In not specify-
ing that the first subsection applies to assured bequests, and that the second
applies to all types of conditional bequests, the regulations leave room for the
argument that bequests not specifically excluded by subsection (b) may qualify
for a deduction by meeting the requirements of subsection (a). Hence, if
Sternberger is read narrowly to prohibit under subsection (b) deductions where
a charitable transfer is subject to the volition or discretion of some individual, a
proportional deduction could be justified under subsection (a) for a charitable
bequest dependent upon nonvolitional and measurable criteria such as life
expectancy.29 In relying on statistical probability or actuarial tables, the gamble
for the Treasury is the same for nonvolitional conditional bequests and assured
bequests: While the amount actually transferred to charity in any particular
case may not equal the amount of the previous deduction, in the aggregate, the
sums transferred to charities will accurately reflect the total deductions per-
mitted.
The rationale of Schildkraut must be examined in light of the court of
appeals' conclusion that a charitable remainder subject to a power of invasion
guaranteeing the life tenant an assured amount of income is governed by sub-
section (a) and not subsection (b) of Treasury Regulation section 20.2055-2.
The court of appeals did not attempt to support its holding with the arguments
that the regulations overlapped or that they did not fully cover the area of
charitable bequests of future interests.8 0 Instead, the court relied solely upon the
29 Two drcuits have not interpreted Sternberger's prohibition against proportional
deductions to be limited to volitional conditions. In United States v. Dean, 224 F.2d 26
(1st Cir. 1955), a bequest to charity was dependent upon the survival of one party by
another. In disallowing the charitable deduction, the court said:
Off band it would seem eminently fair and administratively simple to allow
such a deduction in cases such as this where the chance that charity will take can
be accurately computed actuarially. But the Supreme Court in the Sternberger case
rejected the argument that the applicable regulations permit proportional deductions.
The Court construed section 81A6 . . .as taking not a proportional but an all or
nothing approach to the problem of deductions on account of contingent bequests
to charity. Thus the section either denies any deduction at all for a contingent be-
quest to charity, or else it permits the deduction of the present value of the entire
contingent bequest, allowing the latter whenever "the possibility that charity will
not take is so remote as to be negligible."
224 F.2d at 29.
The same conclusion was reached in Estate of Moffett v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 738
(4th Cir. 1959), where the charity's remainder interest was subject to a power of invasion
for a fixed annual amount in favor of the life tenant. There the court specifically rejected
the executors' argument that the charitable deduction should be valued by subtracting the
actuarial value of the widow's annuity from the total value of the trust. The court dis-
allowed a charitable deduction on the ground that the negligibility test was not satisfied.
30 The argument that Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2 does not fully cover the area of charitable
bequests of future interests recognizes a third category of bequests and urges a deduction
for conditional bequests that are readily measurable with statistical tables and do not in-
volve the elements of volition or personal inducement.
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Treasury Regulations, which had been approved in the Sternberger case, and
adopted an oblique interpretation of those regulations. 81 The remainder of this
Note will analyze subsections (a) and (b) of Treasury Regulation 20.2055-2 in
an attempt to rationalize the distinctions drawn therein and determine whether
the Schildkraut conclusion is justified.
The most obvious distinction between subsections (a) and (b) is the sepa-
ration of assured from conditional bequests. A remainder interest subject to a
power of invasion is nothing more than another form of conditional gift because
the power of invasion, if extensively exercised, can, like a divesting condition,
exhaust the entire principal and leave the remainderman with nothing. An
assured bequest of a future interest is distinguishable from a conditional gift
because there is a complete certainty that the charity will take the principal
at some future time.
The regulations establish two sets of standards for charitable deductions.
If a bequest to the charitable remainderman is assured, subsection (a) permits
a deduction of the present value of the future interest; if the bequest is con-
ditional, subsection (b) requires that the condition which would deprive the
charity of the bequest be shown to be so remote as to be negligible before the
present value of the future interest may be deducted. This difference is sup-
ported by the arguments of the Supreme Court in Humes, Ithaca, Merchants,
and Sternberger that Congress never intended a charitable deduction for funds
that would not eventually be used exclusively for charitable purposes. The re-
moteness exception for conditional bequests is an administrative concession
embracing the de minimus principle of Ithaca.32
The value of assured bequests of future interests to charity may be deter-
mined by actuarial tables. 33 Treasury approval of actuarial tables is an impor-
tant concession to taxpayers who otherwise would be unable to ascertain as
of the date of the testator's death the exact amount of their charitable bequest
and therefore could not qualify for a deduction. 4 In contrast to a deferred
bequest subject to a term of years, the deferred bequest subject to a life estate
involves a variable-lifespan-that can only be estimated for purposes of estab-
lishing present value. Actuarial tables are a convenient but inexact estimate
of the amount that will eventually vest in possession of the charity. In the case
of deferred assured bequests the Commissioner accepts the risk that the life
tenant will outlive his life expectancy, since the degree of error only affects the
measurement of the present value of the future interest and not the certainty
311n so holding, the court knowingly created a split among the courts of appeals, and
specifically mentioned the contrary precedent of Estate of Moffett v. Commissioner, 269
F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1959). Moffett was followed in Florida Nat'l Bank v. United States,
10 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 6179 (S.D. Fla. 1962).
Prior to Schildkraut, two Tax Court decisions had permitted charitable deductions under
similar circumstances. Estate of Alexander, 25 T.C. 600 (1955); Estate of Duker, 18 T.C.
887 (1952).
32 See text accompanying notes 16 to 18 supra.
83 Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(a) refers to Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7 for rules for determining
the present value of a deferred interest; Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7, Table I, shows the present
worth of an annuity, of a life interest, and of a remainder interest depending upon a single
life aged from 0 to 105 years.
34 The estate tax is computed according to facts and circumstances as of the time of
the testator's death. Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151, 155 (1929).
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that the charity will receive the bequest. However, in the case of deferred con-
ditional bequests, part or all of the corpus, in addition to the income interest
outstanding, bangs in the balance. Therefore, while the gamble on the life
expectancy remains the same, the amount of the wager is considerably increased.
To protect against this additional risk, the Commissioner may, in the absence
of a policy statement from Congress or a directive from the courts, decline to
rely on statistical or mortality tables in the area of contingent charitable be-
quests.
85
Before continuing the analysis of assured and conditional bequests to charity,
it may be useful to set forth a few examples of such bequests. The typical
bequest of an assured, severable interest is life estate to X, remainder to charity.
Conditional bequests are ordinarily of two varieties: (1) remainder to charity
if the life tenant dies without issue; (2) remainder to charity if one potential
beneficiary fails to survive another. Charitable remainder interests subject to
a power of invasion in favor of the life tenant are usually established to pro-
vide for the life tenant's: (1) health, wealth, and "happiness;" or (2) emergency
or maintenance based on an accustomed standard of living; or (3) assured
income of a fixed amount each year.
Both the conditional bequest depending upon death without issue and the
power of invasion governed by the whim or desire (for example, happiness) of
the life tenant do not qualify for a charitable deduction.36 The incentive element
precludes any measurement of the interest, and eliminates the test of an objec-
tive, definite standard for appraising the remoteness of the possibility that the
charitable transfer will not become effective.
A charitable bequest conditioned upon the survival of one person by another
that does not meet the negligibility test of subsection (b) must be denied a
charitable deduction for the reason set forth in Sternberger: The charity must
be assured of receiving a benefit commensurate with the deduction allowed.
While the value of a charitable interest may be estimated with mortality and
actuarial tables, such a value reflects not only the present value but also the
risk that the charitable remainderman would not take. Thus, the value of the
charity's interest would not bear a direct relation to the amount which the
charity might receive should the bequest be effective but would be reduced for
the amount of uncertainty involved. The decision of Sternberger to preclude
proportional charitable deductions is supported by dictum in the Merchants
National Bank opinion which points out a difference in testators' motives be-
tween assured and conditional bequests of future interests to charity. In the
former case, the testator dilutes his charitable bequest only to the extent of first
affording specific private legatees the usufruct of his property for a fixed period;
in the latter, the testator prefers to ensure the comfort of his private legatees
and hedges his philanthropy with a condition or power of invasion for their
benefit.
The problem of measurability demonstrates the usefulness of the remoteness,
or negligibility, test for remainders subject to powers of invasion governed by
835 Commissioner v. Estate of Sternberger, 348 U.S. 187, 198 (1955).
36 But cf. United States v. Provident Trust Co., 291 U.S. 272 (1934), which held the con-
clusive presumption that a woman is capable of bearing children as long as she lives not
applicable to estate tax statutes. The condition was held no longer volitional because evi-
dence was introduced that the life tenant was incapable of having issue.
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such objective criteria as maintenance or emergency. While a court of equity
can enforce the exercise or nonexercise of the power with objective standards
and thus make it capable of measurement, no actual measurement is usually
possible at the date of the testator's death, since an estimate of "need" involves
an appraisal of income from other sources, possible medical expenses, and other
variables during the person's life. Consequently, before Sclildkraut, if courts
found the standard of invasion sufficiently definite, they would consistently con-
clude on the facts that the possibility of any invasion was so remote as to be
negligible.sr Hence, the courts never reached the task of measuring the extent
of a power of invasion consistent with deductibility. Schildkraut, on the other
hand, made this measurement and endorsed the rule that, if the extent of a
required invasion could be measured, a deduction would be allowed under sub-
section (a) of Treasury Regulation section 20.2055-2 for the charitable interest
which would remain after invasion. The court based its holding on the finding
that a power of invasion guaranteeing the life tenant a fixed amount of income
is not within the limitations of subsection (b) of Treasury Regulation section
20.2055-2.
The major question under Schildkraut is thus whether the invasion results
in a charitable interest more comparable to a conditional bequest of subsection
(b) or an assured bequest of subsection (a). One distinguishing feature of the
Sckildkraut bequest which separates it from the typical conditional bequest is
the fact that the Schildkraut Foundation's interest is not an all or nothing
possibility, but a function of a nonvolitional probability, such as the length of
the life estate, which tends to diminish, but not eliminate, the charitable re-
mainder. In fact, the Sternberger prohibition against percentage deductions is
inapplicable since Sckildkraut's calculated value estimates the amount of the
bequest based on a given life expectancy and does not attempt to assess the
probability of complete divestment. A second distinction setting apart the
Sckildkraut bequest from charitable gifts subject to a power of invasion for
maintaining an accustomed standard of living is the increased measurability
of an invasionary power to guarantee a fixed amount of income from trust
property. The absence of such fluctuating variables as state of health and
amount of income from independent sources enabled the Schildkraut executors
to measure the maximum amount of principal that would be required each year
to provide the assured level of income to the life tenant, given the stipulated
minimum earning power of the corpus.33 The only variable that had to be esti-
mated-the lifespan of the life tenant-was measured by the actuarial table
approved in the Regulations for determining deductions for assured and sever-
able charitable interests subject to a life estate89
Yet, admitting all of the characteristics of the Schildkraut bequest mentioned
above, there is a strong argument against the similarity to an assured bequest.
A charitable interest subject to any type of power of invasion is a conditional
bequest because the corpus is a wasting asset. While the degree of accuracy of
the actuarial tables remains constant, the degree of error is different for a sever-
able remainder interest than it is for a remainder interest subject to a power
of invasion. The effect of the income beneficiary's outliving his life expectancy
Sr See generally, Taggart, supra note 10, at 563.
3 8 The minimum earning power of the corpus is derived from Treas. Reg. 20.2031-7(f)
1958, Table I, 3Y/j01o annual growth factor.
89 See note 33 supra.
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is far more drastic decline in the value of a wasting asset than of a nonwasting
asset. Each year that the income beneficiary lives beyond the original actuarial
estimate, not only is the present value of the corpus reduced, but also earning
power is consumed and will never be transferred to the charity remainderman.
Thus, it can be argued that the deduction in Schildkraut does not bear a close
enough relationship to the amount which the charity will actually receive and,
hence, violates the Sternberger rule against percentage deductions for conditional
bequests to charity. The conclusion is that, in comparing an assured bequest
to charity to one subject to a power of invasion in favor of a noncharitable
interest, the difference is not only in measurement, but also between nonwasting
and wasting assets; the difference is one of kind and not of degree.
A close reading of Treasury Regulations supports the argument that the
Schildkraut bequest does not properly come within Treasury Regulation section
20.2055-2 (a). The most important phrase in that regulation permits a deduction
"of the value of the charitable beneficial interest only insofar as that interest is
presently ascertainable, and hence severable from the noncharitable interest."
A charity's interest in a bequest subject to a power of invasion cannot be pres-
ently ascertained unless a portion of the charitable bequest is exempt from the
power. "Ascertain" connotes the ability to define the limits of the charitable
bequest and then sever it from the bequest to the private interest. A power of
invasion, though sufficiently described to leave the remainder interest measur-
able, defies the limitation or segregation of one bequest from the other since it
makes one fund subject to the demands of both interests. The Schildkraut court
erred in saying that the charity's interest could be ascertained with actuarial
tables, for such tables can only ascertain the discounted value of that interest
and not the identity interest itself.40 The discounted value of the Schildkraut
Foundation's interest, though calculable by actuarial tables and thus presently
ascertainable, should not qualify for a charitable deduction because it fails to
account for the consequences of a wasting asset: During each year beyond the
estimated life expectancy, the earning power of the corpus is diminished.
In conclusion, both the specific designation in subsection (b) and not in
subsection (a) of charitable bequests subject to powers of invasion and the case
law interpreting these subsections as mutually exclusive argue against a deduc-
tion for the Schildkraut bequest. The arguments distinguishing the Schildkraut-
type power of invasion from powers of invasion governed by less measurable
standards and from volitional conditional bequests show how inadequately the
Regulations cover deferred bequests to charity. Although the Schildkraut bequest
is distinguishable from the charitable interests described in subsection (b), it
does not follow that the bequest is deductible under subsection (a). Unless
Sternberger's distinction between assured and conditional bequests and prohibi-
tion against proportional bequests are limited to volitional conditional bequests,
bequests of charitable interests subject to nonvolitional conditions must be
regarded as within subsection (b) and beyond subsection (a). While disallowing
a charitable deduction for a Sckildkraut-type bequest might point out the un-
fairness in a particular case of drawing distinctions between subsections (a)
and (b), it does not argue in favor of obliterating that line altogether.
Martin E. Harband
40 Only the dicta in Merchants National Bank would agree with the Schildkraut court's
conclusion that Treasury Regulation § 20.2055(a) only requires an interest that has a
presently ascertainable value.
19671
HeinOnline  -- 55 Cal. L. Rev. 947 1967
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
TRUSTS: Consequences of Attorney's Good Faith Representation of Adverse
Parties in Trust Administration-Potter v. Moran (Cal. 1966).
No servant can serve two masters . ... t
Ii the course of estate and trust administration, an attorney or a single law
firm may be in the position of representing both the trustee and beneficiaries
of a particular trust. In any such situation the attorney represents adverse
parties since the beneficiaries may wish to enforce the trust provisions against
the trustee.1 Nevertheless, the attorney might feel impelled to represent such
adverse parties, especially where they are amicable, where the attorney has per-
sonal familiarity with the parties and the property, or where the parties wish
to avoid the added expense of obtaining independent counsel.2 Potter v. Moran,8
however, indicates that such dual representation may deprive accountings and
other proceedings between a trustee and beneficiaries of res judicata effect.
Therefore, in deciding whether to obtain independent counsel, an attorney and
his clients should consider both the practical advantages and the hazards of
even the most well-intentioned dual representation.
4
In Potter v. Moran one law firm represented both the trustee and the
guardian of an estate in trust for minor beneficiaries.5 Although all interested
parties-the trustee, the guardian, and the plaintiff residuary beneficiary-knew
of and acquiesced in this dual representation, 6 the attorneys neglected to inform
the probate court of the conflict when -they appeared to settle the trustee's
interim accounts.7 The probate court approved the accounts, apparently with
'I Luke 16:13.
1 Thus an accounting proceeding is always an adversary proceeding. See, e.g., In re
Enger's Will, 225 Minn. 229, 30 N.W.2d 694 (1948).
2 See note 46 infra and accompanying text.
8 239 Cal. App. 2d 873, 49 Cal. Rptr. 229 (1966), petition for hearing by the Supreme
Court of California denied, id. at 880.
4 To ascertain the practice of attorneys faced with this situation, inquiry was made of
several San Francisco trust and probate attorneys. It revealed a wide divergence of practice.
Some of the attorneys consistently found themselves representing both the beneficiary and
trustee and saw nothing unusual or hazardous in the situation; others fully realized the
potential problems and would under no circumstances tindertake such dual representation.
Between these positions were the practices of those attorneys who would represent both
parties only in the absence of an apparent conflict or with the full consent of the parties.
These attorneys usually stressed the impracticality, especially in terms of expense, of inde-
pendent representation and the desirability of avoiding such expense. However, few of these
attorneys appeared to realize that, as the Potter result emphasizes, conflicts over past
accountings might not manifest themselves until long after the dual representation has
occurred and there has been a supposedly amicable adjudication of the accounts.
5 All parties except the settors had identical interests in and capacities under each of
these trusts. The settior of one trust, Potter Jr., was the father of the minor beneficiaries,
and the settlor of the other was their grandmother and the deceased wife of the plaintiff
residuary beneficiary. The residuary beneficiary had been the original trustee, but at the
time of the transactions in question Moran, a close friend of the family, was serving as suc-
cessor trustee. The guardian of the estate of the minor beneficiaries was a trust company. The
attorneys involved were longtime family attorneys of the Potters and also represented Moran
and the trust company. 239 Cal. App. 2d at 874-75, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 231.
6 As to the effect of this purported acquiescence or consent see text accompanying notes
50-56 infra.
7 239 Cal. App. 2d at 874-77, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 230-32.
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res judicata effect on all interested parties.8 Several years later, however, the
residuary beneficiary brought suit to reopen the accounts and examine them
de novo for evidence of mismanagement and breach of fiduciary duty by the
trustee.9 The trial court refused to reopen the accounts, holding that the pro-
bate court's decree settling them was res judicata. The court of appeal reversed
and ordered the accounts reopened, finding extrinsic fraud in the attorneys'
failure to inform the court of their dual role.'
0
Although the court spoke of lack of disclosure and extrinsic fraud, it based
its decision on the presence of dual representation. It assumed that, had the
probate court known of the dual representation, it would have required the
appointment of independent counsel for the guardian; it stated that "no valid
order could be made" while the same attorneys represented conflicting interests.:"
Therefore, the court implied that dual representation itself, rather than non-
disclosure, precluded a binding judgment.' 2 Disclosure will, as a practical mat-
ter, make a binding judgment possible if the Potter court is correct in assuming
that a probate court informed of dual representation will necessarily require
independent counsel. However, should the probate court fail to eliminate the
dual representation after being informed of its existence, mere disclosure to
the court would not make the decree binding.'3
The Potter court relied on Estate of Charters'4 for the proposition that dual
representation per se will deprive a judgment of its res judicata effect. In
Charters, Justice Traynor, speaking for the California supreme court, held
8 CAL. PROB. CODE § 1123 (West 1956). See note 23 infra and accompanying text.
9 The actual charges concerned both the mismanagement of the trust property, which
included various securities, and the collection of unreasonable fees by both the trustee and
the attorneys. 239 Cal. App. 2d at 879, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
10 239 Cal. App. 2d at 874-77, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 231-32.
11 Id. at 879, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 233. It should be noted that the appellate court made no
finding as to the merits of the allegations of bad faith or breach of fiduciary duty. The court
held only that the previous accounting orders were not binding and sent the case back to the
trial court to examine the substantive issues de novo.
12 "Little did the [probate] court know" that the attorneys were in a position where
they not only did not but "could not give [the guardian] impartial and fair advice.' Id. at
876, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 232 (emphasis added).
13 The decree might still be binding if the parties are estopped by their consent to the
dual representation. See text accompanying notes 47-61 infra.
In actual practice, in light of the informal and pro forma nature of the typical ac-
counting hearing, it is quite possible that disclosure to the probate court will either go
unnoticed or receive only cursory examination. This passive acceptance of dual representation
was found to be the typical situation by many of the attorneys surveyed. An attorney
desiring a binding order at the probate level on the issue of consent or the need for inde-
pendent counsel-that is, a full hearing on the merits of the dual representation-might have
to take the initiative on this question and see that it is fully adjudicated and not left for a
decision de novo on appeal should an appeal later occur.
Perhaps one reason dual representation goes unnoticed is that beneficiaries are often not
present or represented at accounting hearings, and the presence of only one attorney, for the
trustee, is not unusual. As the Potter court indicates, it is presumed in such a situation that
the beneficiary, unrepresented or represented by independent counsel, acquiesces in the ac-
counting. See 239 Cal. App. 2d at 876, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 232. It is only where acquiescence is
tainted by dual representation that the accounting will remain open to challenge.
14 46 Cal. 2d 227, 293 P.2d 778 (1956).
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that a trust accounting in which the same person was both trustee and guardian
of a minor beneficiary's estate was not binding on the minor. The holding is
couched in terms of "extrinsic fraud," as is the Potter decision. Literal reading
of these cases suggests that some form of "fraudulent" conduct-some conceal-
ment or deceit, such as nondisclosure to the court-is necessary in order to
reopen an accounting.' 5 However, Charters does not mention nondisclosure, and
its language indicates rather that whether or not the probate court was deceived
concerning dual representation, its order could not be binding if dual repre-
sentation existed. The court defined extrinsic fraud very broadly, as existing
whenever "a party has been prevented from fully presenting his case and there
has therefore been no adversary trial of the issue."' 6 Thus, to find "extrinsic
fraud" is, in this case, to provide equitable relief to a party who has not re-
ceived a full hearing.' 7 In applying this equitable test, the Charters court found
that the trustee, in "accounting to itself as guardian,' 8 could not adequately
represent the interests of the minor beneficiary; consequently, because the
beneficiary had been deprived of a full adversary hearing, the order obtained
under the dual representation was denied res judicata effect. The Potter court
extended this rationale from the situation in which the trustee and guardian
are the same person to one in which they are represented by the same counsel.' 0
In acting as a fiduciary toward his clients, an attorney is bound to uphold each
client's interests with "undivided fidelity."'20 Therefore, if an accounting is not
res judicata when the same person acts as both trustee and guardian, it cannot
be res judicata when the same person represents both the guardian and the
trustee. In neither case is the minor beneficiary adequately represented because
the person submitting the accounts is also responsible for challenging them.21
15 The classic definition of extrinsic fraud pertains to willful concealment or misrepre-
sentation whereby one party prevents his opponent from obtaining a full adversary hearing,
such as when he conspires to keep his opponent ignorant of the proceedings. E.g., United
States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878); Flood v. Templeton, 152 Cal. 148, 155-57, 92
P. 78, 81 (1907) ; Estate of Standing, 99 Cal. App. 2d 668, 222 P.2d 465 (1950).
16 46 Cal. 2d at 234, 293 P.2d at 783.
1 7 This is by no means a radical departure from precedent. Relief from a judgment has
been granted in cases of accident, Hallett v. Slaughter, 22 Cal. 2d 552, 140 P.2d 3 (1943),
mistake, Bacon v. Bacon, 150 Cal. 477, 89 P. 317 (1907), or simply wherever there is "some
good reason sounding in public policy sufficient to justify the interference of equity."
Bancroft v. Bancroft, 178 Cal. 359, 364, 173 P. 579, 581 (1918). But cf. Greenfield v. Mather,
32 Cal. 2d 23, 36, 194 P.2d 1, 9 (1948) (Traynor, J., dissenting).
1s46 Cal. 2d at 236, 293 P.2d at 783.
19 239 Cal. App. 2d at 879, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 233-34.
20 ABA CANONS OF PROF-SSIONAL ETHICS No. 6. One New York case held that the
attorney for a trustee occupied the same fiduciary relationship toward the trust as did the
trustee himself and "owed an equally high degree of fidelity" to the beneficiaries. In re Bond
& Mortgage Guar. Co., 303 N.Y. 423, 430, 103 N.E.2d 721, 725 (1952).
21 See text accompanying note 1 supra. Even if the attorney were to attack the trustee's
accounts, this itself would raise questions of unethical conduct. See text accompanying note
44 infra.
As early as 1876 it was held that where an attorney "even colorably" appears on both
sides of an adversary proceeding, an injured party may have the judgment vacated, despite a
showing of good faith by the attorney. Moore v. Gidney, 75 N.C. 31, 36 (1876). North
Carolina seems to have the most developed doctrine on this point. Compare Hall v. Shippers
Express, Inc., 234 N.C. 38, 65 S.E.2d 333 (1951), and Marcom v. Wyatt, 117 N.C. 129, 23
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The binding effect and finality of an accounting is crucial for a trustee who
may be personally responsible for trust losses attributable to his unauthorized
or unreasonable transactions. 2 2 Since few transactions are wholly beyond chal-
lenge-particularly investments which are in the least speculative and fees
which are at all above average-trustees rely heavily on the fact that once an
accounting is approved, liability is ordinarily precluded for all transactions
which occurred during the accounting period.23 Under the Potter rule, however,
if the trustee's attorney has been guilty of conflicting representation, the ac-
counting may be reopened and the trustee's account surcharged for poor invest-
ments or unreasonable expenditures. Furthermore, such reopening can occur
years after the transactions were supposedly approved and closed to challenge.
Since the trustee is held liable only for his own acts, and since the dual repre-
sentation allows only a reopening of the accounts, the trustee is still only liable
for prior mismanagement. But there is a difference between judging a transac-
tion when it occurs and evaluating it years later.
24
To find the trustee liable, the Potter doctrine does not appear to require a
showing of bad faith or even negligence; nor does it depend on the trustee's
knowledge of the attorney's dual role. Therefore a later suit to reopen an
accounting may be between a relatively innocent trustee and a completely
innocent beneficiary in a case where their attorney was the one at fault.
The attorney in this situation will not necessarily escape liability. In fact,
the consequences for him may be the severest of all. Liability may be found in
both legal and ethical terms. Representation of adverse interests, at least with-
out complete disclosure to and consent by all parties, is uniformly prohibited
by canons of professional ethics.25 Nor are honesty and good faith mitigating
factors:
S.E. 169 (1895), with Annot., 154 A.L.R. 501 (1945). Cf. In re Bond & Mortgage Guar. Co.,
303 N.Y. 423, 103 N.E.2d 721 (1952); Fisher v. Banta, 66 N.Y. 468, 1 Hun 610 (1876),
quoted in Estate of Charters, 46 Cal. 2d 227, 235, 293 P.2d 778, 783 (1956).
Heretofore, California appears never to have articulated this doctrine clearly; but with
the advent of the Potter rationale, California has apparently adopted it in the form of
"extrinsic fraud."
22 See, e.g., Willson v. Security-First Natl Bank, 21 Cal. 2d 705, 713, 134 P.2d 800, 805
(1943); Creed v. McAleer, 275 Mass. 353, 175 NZ. 761 (1931); 2 A. ScOTT, Ta LAW OF
TRusTs § 201 (2d ed. 1956).
2 3 CAL. PROB. CODE § 1123 (West 1956); McLaughlin v. Security-First Nat'l Bank, 20
Cal. App. 2d 602, 67 P.2d 726 (1937); In re Enger's Will, 225 Minn. 229, 30 N.W.2d 694
(1948). Of course, the accounting order concludes only matters actually placed in issue. See
Wile, Judicial Assistance in the Administration of California Trusts, 14 STAr. L. RPv. 231,
238 & n.33 (1962), and cases cited therein.
24 Such issues as reasonableness would be viewed as of the time and circumstances of
the transaction in question. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hamon, 60 Cal. App. 154, 157, 212
P. 399, 401 (1922) ; Creed v. McAleer, 275 Mass. 353, 357-58, 175 N.E. 761, 762-63 (1931) ;
Bellman v. San Francisco High School Dist., 11 Cal. 2d 576, 582, 81 P.2d 894, 897 (1938)
(tort). See also CAL. Civ. CODE § 2261(1) (West 1954). Nonetheless, some hindsight may
be inevitable where, for example, a particular investment has since proven to be totally
worthless.
25 ABA CANONS OF PROFESsioNAL ETmcs No. 6; RUrs Or PROEssIoNAL CoNnucr or
Tn. STATE BAR OF CmaroRNrA Nos. 5-7, following CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6076 (West
1962). See Anderson v. Eaton, 211 Cal. 113, 116, 293 P. 788, 789-90 (1930); Ishmael v.
Millington, 241 Cap. App. 2d 520, 526-28, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592, 595-97 (1966).
ABA CANON 6 defines conflicting interests as existing whenever, 'in behalf of one
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The rule [against representation of conflicting interests] is designed not alone to
prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to preclude
the honest practitioner from putting himself in a position where he may be required
to choose between conflicting duties, or be led to an attempt to reconcile conflicting
interests, rather than to enforce to their full extent the rights of the interest which
he should alone represent.
2 6
There appear to be three possible consequences for the attorney who dis-
regards this admonition: malpractice (negligence) liability, loss of fees, and
professional discipline.
A California court has suggested that an attorney involved in a conflict
of interest situation could be held liable for malpractice. In Ishmael v. Milling-
ton,27 a husband hired his longtime attorney to represent his wife in an
uncontested divorce action. The wife obtained a property settlement, meeting
only perfunctorily with the attorney and relying on an estimate of community
property given her by her husband.2 8 When the estimate turned out to be far
too low, the wife sued the attorney for malpractice for negligent failure to
ascertain the accuracy of the estimate or otherwise prevent her husband's
deception. There was no allegation or finding of bad faith on the attorney's part.
The district court of appeals ruled that there was a triable issue of fact as to
whether the attorney's actions-or inaction-constituted sufficient negligence to
make him liable for the wife's loss.29 The court stated that in most instances an
attorney is prohibited from representing conflicting or potentially conflicting
interests; but even in the "exceptional" cases where such representation is
allowed, a higher standard of care is imposed on the attorney than would other-
wise be the case.30 There is an affirmative duty on the part of the attorney to
make full disclosure to all parties not only of the adverse interest, but also of
"the detriment to which the dual representation exposes the client and the pos-
sible need of representation by independent counsel." 3' The court seemed to
feel that such disclosure would either have alerted the wife to the possibility
of concealment by her husband, or it would have resulted in the retention of
independent counsel. In either case, nondisclosure was an element of the alleged
negligence, causally related to the loss.
32
client, it is [the lawyer's] duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires
him to oppose." See also Wutchumna Water Co. v. Bailey, 216 Cal. 564, 572, 15 P.2d 505,
509 (1932): "No rule in the ethics of the legal profession is better established nor more
rigorously enforced than this one."
As to the consent issue, see text accompanying notes 47-61 infra.
2 6 Anderson v. Eaton, 211 Cal. 113, 116, 293 P. 788, 790 (1930).
27 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966).
28 It was made clear that the wife relied solely on her husband's estimate and not on
any misrepresentations by the attorney. Id. at 524, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 594. The court considered
reliance immaterial, however, so long as some causal link existed between the attorney's
actions and the loss. Id. at 529-30, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 598.
29 Id. at 528-29, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 597.
80 "The general standard of professional care," that of the "figurative lawyer of ordinary
skill and capacity in the performance of like tasks," is "appropriate to the garden variety
situation, where the attorney represents only one of several parties or interests. It falls short
of adequate description where the attorney's professional relationship extends to two clients
with divergent or conflicting interests in the same subject matter." Id. at 526, 528, 50 Cal.
Rptr. 595, 597.
31 Id. at 526-27 n.3, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 596 n3.
32 Id. at 528-30, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 597-98.
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Several possibilities for malpractice liability thus arise in a situation like
Potter. A malpractice action might be grounded on the attorney's failure to warn
his clients of the possible detrimental consequences of his dual role, on his failure
to suggest the retention of independent counsel, on his failure to disclose the
situation to the court, or on his failure to meet the higher standard of per-
formance imposed by Ishmael. In such a suit, the beneficiary might sue the
attorney directly for losses caused by the trustee's faulty administration; 33 on
the other hand, the trustee might sue the attorney for losses resulting from a
reopening of prior accounts.34 In either instance, of course, the attorney's
liability for malpractice would require a finding of negligence.
Even if the attorney escapes negligence liability, he may be prevented from
collecting fees from one or both parties. A leading California case in this area
is Anderson v. Eaton,3 5 in which the attorney for the plaintiff in a negligence
action was also the counsel for the defendant's insurance carrier. The court
disallowed the attorney's claim for his fee from the plaintiff. Although the facts
of the case reveal possible misrepresentations by the attorney in favor of the
defendant, the court was careful to disregard any imputation of wrongdoing.36
Other courts have similarly disallowed attorneys' fees even where the attorney
won the case for the client owing the fee,37 and where the trial court, had it been
informed of the conflict, would most likely not have required appointment of
independent counsel.38 In the latter case, although the nondisclosure might have
had no bearing on the result, Judge Learned Hand stated that the attorney
"failed in his duty when he did not present this matter to the court and learn its
pleasure."3 0 He added that "the usual consequence" of representing opposing
interests is that the attorney is "debarred from receiving any fee from either
[party] no matter how successful his labors.140
Another consequence of dual representation is professional discipline. In
Thatcher v. United States41 the court considered it grounds for disbarment for
an attorney for one client to challenge work he had previously done for another.
Consequently, even if an attorney for both beneficiary and trustee felt obligated
33 This would be a possible cause of action regardless of whether or not the beneficiary's
attorney also represented the trustee. But the higher standard of care and the fact that the
attorney, in his capacity as counsel for the trustee, himself presented the accounts both to
the court and to the beneficiary, would make the case for the beneficiary much easier. In
Ishmael the attorney's actions and the fact of dual representation were found to be causally
related to the plantiff's loss even though the plantiff had not actually relied on any representa-
tions of the attorney. 241 Cal. App. 2d at 528-30, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 597-98. In accepting an
accounting as reasonable and accurate, however, a beneficiary would be relying on the
attorney's presentation of the accounts as much as on the trustee's. Thus an attorney in a
Potter situation is in a particularly vulnerable position as to responsibility for the merits of
the accounts.
3 4 He might be able to sue for any loss beyond that which he would have suffered had
the transaction been declared unreasonable at the time of the original accounting.
35 211 Cal. 113, 293 P. 788 (1930).
36 See text preceding note 26 supra.
3
T Loew v. Gillespie, 90 Misc. 616, 153 N.Y.S. 830 (Sup. Ct. 1915).
38 Silbiger v. Prudence Bonds Corp., 180 F.2d 917 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J.), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 813 (1950) (fee reduced).
31 Id. at 920-21.
4 0Id.
41212 F. 801, 810-12 (6th Cir. 1914), appeal dismissed, 241 U.S. 644 (1916).
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in good faith to challenge the trustee's accounts, he would be acting unethically,
since he would, in effect, be challenging his own work. Although disbarment is
doubtful except in the most serious cases, lesser disciplinary measures-suspen-
sion42 and reprimand,43 for example-have also been invoked for representation
of adverse interests. Thus attorneys are warned by the bar to avoid even "the
suspicion of collusion which might result" from representation of conflicting
interests.44
An attorney might avoid these possible consequences in several ways. The
only certain way to secure a binding judgment is to retain independent counsel.
As the California supreme court has stated: "The path of unquestionable safety
. . . would be found in abstention from participation, active or merely as
advisers, in any business which may, even by unkind critics, be considered
adverse to their clients' interests." 45
However, the safest way may not always be the most practicable. In a wholly
intrafamily situation, for instance, it might be very difficult to tell one member of
the family to seek independent counsel while continuing to represent other
members. If all parties are presently amicable, it may not be easy to foresee
future conflicts. Moreover, the family attorney's familiarity with both the trust
property and the parties involved may be a valuable asset in preparing and
reviewing the trustee's accounts. And perhaps most important, retaining two
law firms instead of one would probably involve extra expenses which would be
difficult to justify to a client in light of the relative improbability of an open
conflict.4 6 Therefore, alternative courses of action should be considered.
If a binding decree is desired, the only real alternative to abstention is
consent by all parties and full disclosure to the court. Both the California State
Bar Rules of Professional Conduct 47 and the American Bar Association Canons
of Professional Ethics 48 allow representation of adverse interests if consent by
42 See Galbraith v. State Bar, 218 Cal. 329, 23 P.2d 291 (1933).
43 See In re Jeter, 163 Okla. 27, 20 P.2d 886 (1933).
44 Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics, Opinion No. 207, 29 Los
ANoELES B. BulL. 137 (1954).
4 5 Wutchumna Water Co. v. Bailey, 216 Cal. 564, 571, 15 P.2d 505, 508 (1932)
(emphasis added); cf. Magee v. State Bar, 58 Cal. 2d 423, 374 P.2d 807, 24 Cal. Rptr. 839
(1962).
Of course, the fact that an attorney declines to represent a beneficiary-that is,
"abstains"--will not necessarily result in retention of independent counsel. The beneficiary
may decide to forego counsel altogether, thus making possible a binding decree whether or
not the beneficiary is represented at the hearing. See note 13 supra. From the trustee's point
of view, of course, this would be a most desirable alternative. However, for the beneficiary
who desires some representation, abstention by the trustee's attorney does necessitate reten-
tion of independent counsel.
46 There is no doubt that the "law of averages" is on the side of the attorney, since a
challenge of an accounting, especially under the family circumstances dealt with here, is the
exceptional case. Furthermore, where a trust is quite small it may actually be more eco-
nomical to risk liability (or to pay the cost of insurance), or not to go to court at all than to
obtain other counsel. For these reasons many attorneys and trustees will probably assume
the risk of a nonbinding judgment even where other considerations might point to retention
of independent counsel. Such a decision should, of course, be made with the full knowledge
and consent of all those concerned.
4 7 Nos. 5-7, following CAL. Bus. & PROF. CoDE § 6076 (West 1962).
4 8 No. 6.
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all parties is obtained. To assure intelligent consent, the ABA also requires full
disclosure to the parties of all relevant facts; the California cases have adopted
this requirement. 49 Valid consent, however, is an extremely elusive concept. For
example, in Potter the guardian, the plaintiff residuary beneficiary, and the
trustee all supposedly consented to the dual representation by the attorneys.
But the court pointed out that, although the plaintiff was also an attorney, he
was very old (over ninety) and quite sick; furthermore, he had "no reason to
believe" the attorneys would fail to disclose the facts to the court or would
otherwise fail to represent his interests fully.50 As for the guardian's supposed
consent, the court simply assumed that the guardian, being "under the influence"
of his attorneys, could not be considered to have given adequate consent.51 This
approach implies that consent elicited by the attorney himself may not be valid.
Since it is necessarily the attorney who discloses the conflict situation to the
parties, and since the client would probably rely on his attorney's suggestion on
such legal matters, consent completely divorced from the attorney's "influence"
seems unlikely.
52
Even if the guardian's consent were shown to be completely informed and
independent, there might be other obstacles to obtaining valid consent. It has
been held that a guardian has no power to act adversely to the interests of his
ward.53 He may not "waive legal rights in behalf of his ward, or surrender or
impair rights vested in the ward, or impose any legal burden thereon. Nor . . .
can the ward be estopped . . . by reason of the guardian's act."54 Before a
guardian could consent to dual representation so as to estop the minor, he would
have to show that the decision was calculated to serve the best interests of the
minor 55 Dual representation has the obvious benefit of conserving trust corpus
by avoiding extra legal fees. However, the difficulty of predicting the conse-
quences of dual representation and the apparent reluctance of the courts to
recognize consent where harm has already resulted would make such a showing
difficult.56
49 Id. See Anderson v. Eaton, 211 Cal. 113, 116, 293 P. 788, 789-90 (1930) ; Ishmael v.
Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 526-27 & n.3, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592, 595-96 & n.3 (1966);
cf. Los Angeles County Bar .Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics, Opinion No. 207, 29 Los ANGELzs
B. BuLL. 137 (1984). The requirements for disclosure to the parties are extremely strict and
comprehensive. See Ishmael v. Millington supra.
50 239 Cal. App. 2d at 879, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
51 Id. at 878, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 233. The court's assumption was apparently based on
challenges made by the guardian to subsequent accounts, after independent counsel had been
appointed. Id.
52 Cf. In re Boone, 83 F. 944, 955-56 (C.C.N.M. Cal. 1897).
53 For example, the guardian cannot "make admissions affecting substantial rights of
the minor so as to bind the minor2 Stolte v. Larkin, 110 F.2d 226, 233 (8th Cir. 1940);
accord, White v. Joyce, 158 U.S. 128, 146 (1894). And a ward will not be barred in a claim
by the laches of his guardian. Roach v. Matanuska Valley Farmers Cooperative Ass'n, 87
F. Supp. 641, 648 (D. Alas. 1949), aff'd, 188 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1951).
54 Stockman v. City of South Portland, 147 Me. 376, 382, 87 A.2d 679, 683 (1982),
quoting 28 Am. JuR. Guardian & Ward § 101 (1940).
55 See Webster v. Horton, 188 Ark. 610, 613, 67 S.W.2d 200, 201 (1934) ; Leonardini v.
Wells Fargo Bank, 131 Cal. App. 2d 9, 280 P.2d 81 (1955); Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 1098 (1956).
56 A beneficiary who is not sui juris could consent only through a guardian. See CAL.
CODE Civ. PRo. § 372 (West 1954); 2 A. ScoTT, THE LAw oF TRUSTS § 216.3 (2d ed. 1956).
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Assuming, however, the attorney decides that obtaining consent is preferable
to retaining independent counsel, there are several possible methods by which
consent might be obtained. While oral agreement may be sufficient if it can be
established, written consent is obviously preferable. As to the coverage and
timing of the agreement, consent might be secured at the outset of the repre-
sentation, or prior to each particular transaction (or accounting), or subsequent
thereto. It might encompass either particular transactions or the entire attorney-
client relationship. The attorney who obtains consent only at the outset may
later find that -changed -circumstances have rendered it inadequate." Further-
more, it has been held that a written general release from "all the duties,
burdens, obligations, and privileges" of an attorney's dealings with a former
client is too broad and therefore void as contrary to public policy. 8 If an
attorney wants to represent an interest adverse to his work for a present or
former client, waiver must be "distinct and unconditional."5 9 Thus, on the
assumption that some form of consent would be effective in a Potter situation,
the safest consent would seem to be a written waiver, obtained prior to and
clearly covering the specific transaction involved. It would necessarily have to be
preceded by full disclosure to the client, including a warning as to all foreseeable
conflicts and at least a suggestion of retaining independent counsel.
It is always advisable to disclose dual representation and consent to the
court at the outset of any proceeding. This disclosure would provide an oppor-
tunity for an immediate ruling on the validity of the consent, when independent
counsel could still be secured. Furthermore, the attorney who, for whatever
reason, conceals the fact of dual representation from the court may be subject to
loss of fees, 0° if not loss of the judgment.
Clearly, reliance on consent and disclosure presents serious difficulties which
are not easily eliminated. If the language of the courts is to be taken literally,
valid consent seems virtually impossible. But despite such language, it may be
that a good faith effort to obtain valid consent, including all the elements out-
lined above,61 would be sufficient to bind adult parties and possibly a guardian
of minor parties. The lawyer who faces a conflict of interest may either
"abstain" or "disclose." It is best to abstain from dual representation; but if
abstention is impracticable, the safest course is to make full disclosure to all
parties and to the court. Dual representation may deprive a decree of binding
effect, even absent a showing of actual fraud, bad faith, or willful misdealing.
For although an attorney may have the best of intentions, it is impossible to
afford full and undivided representation to even the most amicable of adverse
parties. The adversary system presupposes more than good faith by the trustee
and his attorney: it assumes careful scrutiny of all transactions by an advocate
able to give undivided loyalty to the beneficiary. In trusts, as in any other
Therefore, where a guardian must be appointed for this purpose, additional expense is in-
curred, nullifying some of the practical advantages of consent over independent counsel.
5 See Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics, Opinion No. 266, 38 Los
ANGErms B. Bu-L. 141, 143 (1963).
58 In re Boone, 83 F. 944, 957 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1897).
59 Id. at 958.
60 See text accompanying notes 35-40 supra.
61 See text following note 58 supra.
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branch of the law, while it is the judge's duty to be impartial, it is the attorney's
duty to be biased. An attorney, of all "servants," is the least able to serve two
masters.
Mark Reutlinger
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